A nominalistic account of mathematical truth. by Oldfield, Edward Arthur
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1977
A nominalistic account of mathematical truth.
Edward Arthur Oldfield
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Oldfield, Edward Arthur, "A nominalistic account of mathematical truth." (1977). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2096.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2096

A NOMINALISTIC ACCOUNT OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH
A Dissertation Presented
by
EDWARD ARTHUR OLDFIELD
Submitted to the Graduate School of theUniversity of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1977
Department of Philosophy
ii
(c) Edward Arthur Oldfield
All rights reserved
1977
A NOMINALISTIC ACCOUNT OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH
iii
A Dissertation
By
EDWARD ARTHUR OLDFIELD
Approved as to style and content by:
Michael Jubien, Chairman of Committee
Edmund L. Gettier III, Member
Terence Parsons, Member
September 1977
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
iv
My greatest debt for help in writing this dis-
sertation is owed to Michael Jubien. His advice and
criticism taught me a great deal and led to substantial
improvements in this work. In addition, his writings have
been a focal point of my thought on the topics considered
here. I would also like to thank Terence Parsons for his
helpful criticism of this dissertation.
Portions of drafts of this dissertation were
delivered at Syracuse University, the University of Illinois-
Urbana Champaign and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
.
I would like to thank the participants in those discussions
for their comments. In particular, I would like to thank
Peter vanlnwagen and Jose Benardete.
Finally, I would like to thank my teachers, espe-
cially Jose Benardete, Fred Feldman, Edmund Gettier, Kenneth
Haas, Michael Jubien, Thomas McKay and Terence Parsons for
giving me a conception of what philosophy is and how it
ought co be done.
L
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
CHAPTER I
. .
CHAPTER II
. .
CHAPTER III
. .
CHAPTER IV
. .
CHAPTER V
. .
CHAPTER VI
. .
REFERENCES
. . .
Page
. iv
. 1
. 24
. 52
. 69
. 88
.107
.130
1CHAPTER I
This dissertation attempts to make a contribution
to the project of giving an adequate nominalistic account
of mathematical truth. What should an account of mathe-
matical truth provide? This is difficult to say. Roughly
speaking, the idea would be to specify what mathematical
sentences "say". This, of course, is vague. At the mini-
mum, however, an account of mathematical truth should give
a theory of truth for mathematical sentences.
As here conceived, the project of giving an adequate
nominalistic account of mathematical truth would proceed as
follows
:
1) An informal mathematical language^" a sen-
tence belongs to is specified.
2) A formal language is described.
3) A translation procedure is described mapping
sentences of the informal language into sen-
tences of the formal language.
Throughout this dissertation 'theory' and 'language'
will be used to mean 'interpreted theory' and 'interpreted'language
,
respectively. In speaking of uninterpreted theo-
ries or languages, I will make this explicit, often usingthe modifier 'uninterpreted'. There will also be occasionto speak of formal and informal theories and languages. A
ormal theory (language) will always be a theory (language)
cised on first order syntax for which an interpretation is
explicitly provided. An informal theory (language) will be
any other theory (language)
. Thus we will speak of the in-formal theory 'there are numbers', the interpretation ofthis theory beings imply its ordinary English meaning, i.e.its meaning in the informal language English.
24) It is argued that this translation procedure
gives adequate representations of the sentences
of the informal language. (Of course, it will
be difficult to say what an adequate repre-
sentation is.)
5) 'Nominalism' is defined.
6) It is argued that the formal theories which are
translations of informal theories are nominal-
istic.
The definition of truth would be: a sentence is
true if its translation is true in some formal language which
adequately represents some language to which that sentence
belongs. Similarly, a sentence is false (neither true nor
false) if its translation is false (neither true nor false)
in some formal language which adequately represents some
language to which that sentence belongs.
In (1) 'sentence' means 'interpreted sentence'.
Only interpreted sentences "say" anything. Thus it is only
interpreted sentences for which an account can be given.
Note also in (1) we speak of finding a language, rather
than the language, to which a sentence belongs. Clearly,
any mathematical sentence belongs to English. Such sentences
are also sentences of certain sub-languages of English, e.g.
arithmetical language, so that there is no such thing as
the language to which a given sentence belongs.
Throughout this dissertation (1) will present no
problem. We will always be speaking of interpreting lan-
guages (not just sentences) so that whenever an individual
3sentence is considered, the language to which it belongs
will already have been specified.
The contribution that this dissertation attempts to
make to this project of giving an adequate nominalistic
account of mathematical truth is as follows. Under (5), a
theory is nominalistic if it is not ontologically committed
to any particular abstract entities and it is not ontologi-
cally committed to the kind abstract entity
. The notion of
nominalism, as here understood, thus depends on the notion
of ontological commitment. This latter is a notion which is
discussed in Chapter II.
In that chpater criteria of ontological commitment
are advanced which apply to formal theories of the kind
described in later chapters. The work here is partly supple-
mental to and partly critical of Michael Jubien's work
([12], [13]) on this topic. Jubien proposed criteria which
employ the notion of a quantificational model structure
'\G
,
K
,
1 in the sense of Kripke [15], Jubien suggests
that these criteria are properly applied only in conjunction
with certain model structures. He makes only fleeting com-
ments, however, concerning what is an appropriate model
structure for applying these criteria. Chapter II attempts
to say what is an appropriate model structure for applying
these criteria. This involves specifying what sort of
"worLds” are to go into such a model structure. It is also
4argued that if a model structure of the sort defined in this
chapter is used in applying criteria of ontological commit-
ment, then some very simple criteria considered and rejected
by Jubien are adequate. The notion of commitment used then
in later chapters implies that a theory is committed to a
particular if that particular exists in every world at which
that theory is true; a theory is committed to a kind k if
there are k' s at every world at which that theory is true.
Chapters III and IV take up (2), (3) and (6) above.
In Chapter III a general technique for interpreting first
order languages is considered. Roughly speaking, the idea
is that instead of assigning (at a world) a single range for
the quantifiers and single denotations for the constants and
predicates, the quantifiers, constants and predicates are
given multiple interpretations. This technique will be
described a bit more fully, in an introductory fashion, later
in this chapter.
Employing this general technique then particular
formal languages are described, procedures are given for
translating sentences of some informal mathematical languages
into these formal languages and it is then argued that the
formal theories which represent pure mathematical theories
such as Peano arithmetic and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory are
nominalistic
.
Chapter IV introduces another general technique for
5interpreting first order languages. Again, this technique
will be introduced in somewhat more detail later in this
chapter, but very roughly the idea is as follows. As above
the quantifiers, constants and predicates are given multiple
interpretations
. A sentence is true if neces sarily it is
true in every interpretation having certain properties
.
As in Chapter II, particular formal languages inter-
preted using this general technique are described; the method
for translating from some informal mathematical languages
into these languages is given and finally it is argued that
the formal theories which are translations of informal mathe-
matical theories are true in the empty world (the world at
which nothing exists). (That there is such a world, as the
notion is used here, is a consequence of the discussion of
Chapter II.) This, of course, implies that these formal
theories are nominalistic.
It is to be emphasized that what are of most interest
in these chapters are the general techniques introduced, not
the particular languages described. First, no attempt is
made to deal with all mathematical languages
. Only certain
examples are chosen. Also this emphasis on the general tech-
niques becomes obvious in the discussion of set theory where
in Chapter III, two 1 importantly different interpretations
are given. It is less obvious in other places, but it should
be kept in mind. For example, an interpretation of a com-
bined number theory-set theory is given which allows ' 0=<6
’
6to be neither true nor false. An interpretation of another
language allows (the translation of) 'all apples are sets'
to be neither true nor false. Such results are not built
into these techniques, however, for different results can be
obtained for these sentences using these techniques. The
flexibility of these techniques should be emphasized.
Finally
,
throughout both of these chapters the techniques
interpretation are also applied to languages which mix
both mathematical and non-mathematical vocabulary.
In Chapters V and VI, (4) is considered. These
chapters attempt to indicate the inadequacies of a platon-
istic interpretation of mathematical languages. In both of
these chapters, arguments are considered which may be con-
strued as attempting to show that informal arithmetic, for
example, is not committed to the kind number nor to any
particular. If these arguments were sound, this would sug-
gest (though, of course, not entail) that informal mathe-
matical language is most adequately represented by a language
interpreted using one of the techniques presented in the
preceding chapters. The argument discussed in Chapter V is
that of Paul Benacerraf [2], In Chapter VI an argument of
Jubien's is considered [14]. In both cases it is contended
that these arguments are inconslusive
. These arguments do,
however, raise questions which are sufficient to motivate
interest in the work of Chapters III and IV.
7The treatment of (4) in this dissertation is thus
quite incomplete. First, there is no conclusive argument
that platonism is false or that if platonism is false, then
some interpretation employing one of the techniques presented
here is correct. Second, as emphasized above, even if it is
assumed that some interpretation employing one of the tech-
niques presented here is correct, little is said to justify
the claim that one particular such interpretation is correct.
For example, some finitists and constructivists have held
that many of the sentences mathematicians generally hold to
be true are not true. Such positions are ignored (but not
ruled out) here. They would have to be considered in a com-
plete account of mathematical truth.
The general position to be considered 'here holds,
among other things, that although 'there are numbers' is
true, this informal theory is not committed to the kind
number or to the kind abstract entity
. One natural response
to this is to ask for an account of this theory which does
not imply that this theory has such commitments. It might
well be expected that this positive project cannot be
accomplished. That is, it might be suspected that no reason-
able account of ' there are numbers ' can be given which does
not imply that this theory is ontologically committed to
the kind number.
8Chapters III and IV attempt to show that this sus-
picion is incorrect. That is, this theory can be given an
account (which has some plausibility) according to which
this theory does not have such a commitment. Platonism
is seen not to be the only plausible basis for giving an
account of mathematical truth. Another objection to this
general position is as follows.
This objection begins by noting that a common, even
paradigmatic, way that a theory can have an ontological com-
mitment to a kind k or an individual a is simply to assert
'there are k's' or 'a exists'. From this it is concluded
that 'there are numbers' and 'one exists' must have an
ontological commitment to the kind number and the particular
one, respectively. Thus the general position considered
in this dissertation is untenable.
I agree that 'there are k's' and 'a exists' commonly
do have ontological commitments. In fact, it is by using
such sentences that the notion of ontological commitment is
generally explained: theory T is ontologically commited to
a just in case T says that a exists.
This indicates that a position which held that no
theory has ontological commitments is in a serious difficulty
how is 'exists' being used if it is claimed that no theory
says that anything exists? Let us grant then that at least
some interpreted sentences of the form 'a exists' and 'there
are k's' must have ontological commitments. Still this
9leaves open the possibility that this is not true in all
cases. In particular, the above considerations do not show
that it is untenable to hold that in mathematics sentences
which seem to have ontological commitments do not have these
commitments. It is just such a position which is developed
in Chapters III and IV.
The technique for interpreting first order theories
which will be investigated in Chapters III and IV has been
more or less anticipated by Hartry Field [7], Michael Jubien
([12], [14]), Paul Benacerraf [2], Hilary Putnam [22] and
(on Field's interpretation) Quine [26], We will build to
the presentation of this technique by discussing Field's
and Jubien' s approaches.
Hartry Field introduced the notion of partial signif-
ication (or partial reference) as a way of dealing with the
question of indeterminacy which has been raised by Quine.
To take the well-known case, Field suggests that if we were
faced with a situation in which we could translate 'gavagai'
either as 'rabbit' or 'undetached rabbit part' we should
say that 'gavagai' partially signifies the set of rabbits
and that it partially signifies the set of undetached
rabbit parts.
Now thxs, particular application of the concept of
partial signification is of no special interest here, but
the concept itself is. The idea behind it is that even if
10
a word has not been suitably "hooked up" with reality (how-
ever, that may work) so that it has a single referent, still
it may be that there is a class of things all of which are
referents to that word. Reference then is a special
case of partial reference: it is that case in which a word
partially refers to only one thing. In general, however, the
notion of partial reference has application in situations
where, roughly, a word is used in such a way that there is
more than one thing which has equal right to be called the
referent of that word. A very simple example of this notion
might be that if one person wrote the Iliad and another
wrote the Odyssey it might be reasonable to say the 'Homer'
partially referred to both of these authors.
A fuller understanding of this notion is, however,
only to be gained by seeing how it is used to give an inter-
pretation of a first order language. Field uses this notion
to define the conditions under which a structure for a first
order language L partially accords with the semantics for
Lr The idea is that L is a (formalized version of) natural
language and that the structure assigns referents to names
and extensions to predicates which those names and predicates
2partially signify. More precisely:
The "semantics for L" then should be understood as
being the semantical properties of the language which L is
intended to mormalize. These semantical properties would
include what the partial referents of the terms of that
language are
.
o(1) A structure M partially accords with the
semantics of L if and only if each term of L
partially denotes or partially signifies the
entity which M assigns to it. (211)
Characterizing truth for a language interpreted in
this way is then easy.
(2) A sentence of L is true if and only if it is
true-relative-to-M for every structure M that
partially accords with the semantics of
-
L
( 212 )
Also we may add
(3) A sentence of L is false if and only if it is
false-relative-to-M for every structure M that
partially accords with the semantics for
-
L.
A simple example will illustrate the technique here,
consider the language L which has one name 'h' and one one-
place predicate 'F' whose intended interpretation is dis-
course concerning the fatness of Homer. Assume as above that
'h' partially denotes two different people a and b. Assume
also that 'F' partially denotes only one set: the set of
fat people. There will then be two interestingly different
structures for L which partially accord with the semantics
for L. One such structure assigns a to 'h'
,
while the other
assigns b to 'h'
.
Now the truth of the sentence 'Fh' will
depend on the fatness of a and b. If both of them are fat
'Fh' is true; if neither of them are fat ' Fh' is false; while
otherwise 'Fh' is neither true nor false. Of course,
Field and I both use 'structure' in the sense of
Shoenfield [31]
.
12
a priori each ot these cases is possible. This brings out
an important point: structures which partially accord with
the semantics for L need not be elementarily equivalent:
they need not make the same sentences true.
Unfortunately (1) is not in general adequate, as
Field points out ([7]: 214). The simplest sort of example
of this is the following. Suppose we say that 'gavagai'
partially signifies both the set of rabbits and the set of
rabbit parts. Suppose also that another word 'gavago' also
partially signifies both of these sets, but that the native
equivalent of 'All gavagai are gavago' is false. (Thus,
it might be said that ' gavagai '-' gavago
' are paired much as
rabbit - rabbit part' are paired in English.) According
to (1), however, a structure which assigned the set of
rabbits to both 'gavagai' and 'gavago' could partially accord
with the semantics of the native language. In such a struc-
ture the equivalent of 'All gavagai are gavago' would be
true and so by (3) this sentence would not be false.
Field says that the problem here is that 'gavagai'
and 'gavago' are "correlatively indeterminate". Both par-
tially signify the same sets, but roughly speaking, when-
ever 'gavagai' signifies one set, 'gavago' signifies another.
To deal with this ^problem, Field introduces the concept of
one term being the basis of another term tv, (t-^bCt^)).
If t-^ is the basis of tv,
,
then the signification of t
2
is a
13
function of the signification of A term is independent
if it does not have a basis. (1) is then revised as follows.
(1“) A structure M partially accords with the
semantics of L if and only if (M(t) is the
signification of t in M)
(a) each independent term of L partially
denotes or partially signifies M(t)
;
(b) each dependent term t of L denotes or
signifies M(t) relative to the correla-
tion of M(b(t)) with b (t)
.
This presents us with two problems. First, what
exactly is it for one term to be the basis of another?
Second, what does (b) of (1*) assert? The second problem
can be dealt with fairly easily. What Field has in mind
here is that M assigns a dependent term t the correct value
relative to what M assigns the basis of t. This can be
made precise as follows. We introduce the notion of a func-
tion f for a language. f is a function of three arguments
whose first and second domains both consist of all the terms
and predicates of L and whose third domain and whose range
consist of all sets. When given a term t of L, its basis and
a set a (the signification of the basis of t) as arguments,
f gives as value a set. This latter set would be the signifi-
cation of t relative to the assignment of a to its basis. We
may interpret (b) of (1*) then as saying that
(b
'
)
the function f for L is such that M(t)=
(
f(t, M(b(t)).
This is, of course, very schematic. Field tells us
nothing about which of the functions r are functions for a
14
language, except that they are supposed to operate in such
a way that the difficulty we have considered concerning (1)
can be avoided; nor, to return to the first problem, does he
say what it is to be the basis of a term. A more serious
problem is that there is no guarantee that (1*) will work in
general. It does seem to work in many cases. Thus, for ex-
ample, suppose, we have a simple arithmetical language L
whose non -logical vocabulary consists of a one-place function
letter and a name 'O'
. Then it would be natural to say
that S is the basis of 'O' and that a structure M partially
accords with the semantics of L if M('0')= the "zero" of
what M assigns to 'S'
.
(That is, if 'S’ is assigned a set
of ordered paris, M('O') is the unique thing which is the
first member of one such ordered pair, but is not the second
member of any such ordered pair.) This essentially tells us
what the function f is for the language L.
There is, however, a serious problem for this ap-
proach. Suppose that both 'gavagai' and 'gavago' partially
signify the set of rabbits, the set of rabbit parts and the
set of rabbit stages and that the native equivalent of 'All
gavagai are gavago' is false. Suppose now that we attempt
to interpret that fragment L of the native language whose
non- logical vocabulary consists only of the predicates
'gavagai' and 'gavago'. We have seen above that if we let
15
both ' gavagai' and 1 gavago
' be independent, it will turn
out that 'All gavagai are gavago' is not false. So let us
assume chat gavagai is the basis of 'gavago' and consider
a structure M which assigns the set of rabbits to 'gavagai'.
Intuitively M could assign either the set of rabbit parts or
the set of rabbit stages to 'gavago' and still partially
accord with the semantics for L. However, the function f
for L must assign one of these sets (and not the other) to
'gavago' and so it seems that either the structure which
assigns the set of undetached rabbit parts to 'gavago' or
the structure which assigns the set of rabbit stages to
'gavago' does not partially accord with the semantics for
L. This is an undesirable result.
This problem could be solved if we dropped the re-
quirement that there be a single function for a language.
If we allowed that there could be two functions for the
language L above the p rob lei^ would be solved. However, we
are still left with the primitive notions of a function for
a language and a term being the basis of another term. Until
something more is said about these notions, there is no
guarantee that even this further complication will be adequate
in general. Furthermore, throughout all of this the notion
of partial signification plays a minimal role and, as Field
says, "the existence of such correspondence relations as
16
[this] is not a cause for much satisfaction unless we can
use them in an explanation of truth and falsehood" ([7]: 209).
What is unclear here is whether the notion of partial sig-
nification will actually do any work when it is finally said
what a function for a language is.
The notion of partial signification was introduced
to deal with situations where different things have equal
right to be the signification of a term (or predicate). The
problem we have run into here is, roughly, that we cannot in
general form structures which partially accord with the
semantics for a language by making arbitrary choices among
the partial significations of the terms of that language.
Intuitively, we have to look at the structure as a whole and
see whether it is adequate. In the light of the difficulties
raised above, I think then that it is best for our purposes
to take the notion of 'partial accordance' (or as it will be
called here 'acceptability') as primitive,
. (2) and (3) then
remain intact. We no -longer need (1*) although the idea
behind it may be helpful in explaining in certain cases which
structures are acceptable for the semantics for a language.
Also, 'partial signification' can be defined: a term t_
partially signifies a in L if there is a structure M which
is acceptable for the^semantics for L and t signifies a in M.
Just as partial signification is a generalization
of signification, so the notion of a structure being
17
acceptable is a generalization of the notion of a structure
being intended, as, for example, when it is said that a cer-
tain model is the intended or standard structure for a
language. The notion of being an intended structure is a
special case of being an acceptable structure: it is the
case where it is the only acceptable structure. In general,
however, we will speak of acceptable structures in cases
where
,
for one reason or another, it is not appropriate to
speak of the intended structure of the language.
As Field points out, one possible application of the
notion of an acceptable structure is to problems of vague-
ness. "Red", for example, does not have a single, non-
fuzzy, set as its extension. To interpret a language which
has 'red' as its only non-logical vocabulary, we would not
interpret it by a single structure, but by a class of accept-
able structures. To be acceptable, a structure must in-
clude some things in the extension of 'red', e.g. ripe
tomatoes, but acceptable structures could diverge over
whether to assign certain other things to the extension of
red'
.
A sentence of the language would be true if it was
true in all (or perhaps "most") of the acceptable structures
for the language, false if it was false in all (or perhaps
"most") of the acceptable structures for the language and
indeterminate otherwise. This may serve to indicate the
possible applications of the notion. I believe that the
18
idea is fairly clear. We will have more to say about the
notion of an acceptable structure, as applied to the case
°f interpreting mathematical languages later.
We have now arrived at a generalization of a tech-
nique for interpreting first order languages which is em-
ployed by Michael Jubien as a way of formally representing
informal mathematical theories which are believed not to
have certain ontological commitments. Both the question of
ontological commitment and this application to an account of
mathematical truth will be of interest to us later, but for
now we are interested only in the general technique.
Jubien s approach is as follows
. In some cases
,
constants and predicates of a language do not have referents
and extensions (for whatever reason) so that it is not pos-
sible to interpret this language (in accordance with the
semantics for that language) by a single structure which
assigns objects to constants and extensions to predicates.
Even so, in some of these cases the language (and a theory
stated in that language) may provide enough information so
that it is possible to say what the intended isomorphism
type of a structure of that language would be. For such
languages (and Jubien thinks that mathematical languages are
prime examples of this) it may be appropriate to interpret
them not by a single structure but by a set of structures of
‘-he intended isomorphism type. Subject to a complication to
19
be noted shortly, truth of a sentence is characterized as
truth in all such structures. Falsehood is falsehood in all
such structures. Note that the requirement that the inter-
preting structures be isomorphic implies that if a sentence
is true (false) in one of these structures, it is true (false)
in all such structures. Thus no room is left for sentences
which are neither true nor false.
It is clear in what sense Jubien's technique is a
special case of the technique discussed above. Jubien's
technique coincides with the latter technqiue in the special
case in which the acceptable structures for a language are
pairwise isomorphic. It is only a special case, for in
general there Is no requirement that the acceptable struc-
tures of a language be isomorphic. In fact, there is no
requirement that the acceptable structures for a language
be elementarily equivalent and it is this which allows for
the possibility that there are sentences of a language inter-
preted by a set of acceptable structures which are neither
true nor false.
Of course, the terminology introduced above carries
over to Jubien's technique. Thus we may say, for example,
that the constants of the theories (if there are any) which
are properly -interpreted in accordance with Jubien's tech-
nique have (multiple) partial referents. Although the con-
stants of such theories do not have referents, they do have
20
partial referents.
The complication in Jubien's approach which was
noted above is that it involves the notion of necessity.
He is interested in interpreting theories which (1) for
whatever reason are not appropriately interpreted by a
single structure (2) do, however, provide enough information
so that it is possible to tell what the intended isomorphism
type of a model of that theory would be (3) but which could
be true even if there actually were no model of that intended
isomorphism type. The technique as thus far described en-
counters difficulties over (3) . If there are no acceptable
structures for a theory, then on the characterization of
truth as truth in all acceptable structures, every sentence
of such a theory would be true. Alternatively if we charac-
terize truth as : A is true in L if there is an acceptable
structure for L and A is true in all acceptable structures
to L, and falsehood as: A is false in L if A is false in all
acceptable structures for L, we would get the result that
every sentence of such a theory is false. Both of these
results are unacceptable.
Jubien suggests that to interpret such theories we
consider all possiole models of the intended isomorphism
type. A sentence of a language L is then true if necessarily
tor every model' of the intended isomorphism type that sen-
tence is true in that model.
21
Once again, this may be generalized to the case
where not all the acceptable structures for a language are
isomorphic. Truth (and falsehood) are defined as before.
Our results may now be summarized (these defini-
tions are preliminary and will be superceded in later chap-
ters) : An acceptably interpreted first order language (AIL)
is an ordered pair ^L, M^> where L is a first order language
and M is a set of structures of L. A sentence A of an AIL
(h, M> is true if M=e$ and A is true in all m in M; it is
false if it is false in all m in M.
A modally acceptably interpreted first order language
(MAIL) is an ordered pair (h, where L is a first order
language and $ is a sentence of the form: a structure S is
acceptable for X if
_. A sentence A is true in
if necessarily for all structures S if S is accept-
if necessarily for all structures S if S is acceptable for
L, then A -is false in S. -
Before proceeding to a fuller discussion of AIL's
and MAIL 1 s
,
other anticipations of the technique employed
here may be noted. When Paul Benacerraf says, "Number
theory is the elaboration of the properties of all struc-
tures of the order type of the numbers. The number words
do not have single referents," ([2]: 70-1) one plausible
way of interpreting him is to say that he thinks that the
able for L, then A is true in S; it is false in
22
language of arithmetic is properly understood as an AIL and
that numerals do not have single referents but that they do
have partial referents.
When Hilary Putnam says, "Now the natural way to
interpret set-theoretic statements in the modal-logical
language is to interpret them as statements of what would
necessarily be the case if there were standard models for
the set theories in question," ([22]: 20) he appears to be
considering the possibility of interpreting set theory as
a MAIL.
Since interpretations by sets of structures may be
somewhat unfamiliar and since such interpretations in general
allow for sentences to be indeterminate, i.e. neither true
nor false, some elementary points about the logic of lan-
guages interpreted in this way may be in order. We restrict
our attention to cases where the set of structures used to
interpret a language is non-empty. Thus we consider inter-
pretations by arbitrary, non-empty sets of structures. We
say that a sentence is valid* if it is true in all such
interpretations
.
(1) All and only classical first order logical
truths are valid*. The proof of this is obvious. This dif-
ferentiates the interpretation studied here from other
familiar interpretation which allow a third truth value,
but, relative to which not all classical logical truths are
valid.
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(2) Obviously,
-A is true (false) (indeterminate)
if A is false (true) (indeterminate). The situation with
respect to disjunctions is somewhat more complicated. If
either (or both) A or B are true, then AvB is true. If
both A and B are false, their disjunction is false. If one
is indeterminate and the other is false, their disjunction
is indeterminate (since it is true in the non-empty set of
structures in which the indeterminate disjunct is true and
false in the non-empty set of structures in which the inde-
terminate disjunct is false). Thus far disjunction operates
on this interpretation just as it operates in Kleene's strong
three-valued logic. The remaining case in which both A and
B are indeterminate admits of two possibilities. On this
assumption, AvB cannot be false (since it is true in any of
the structures in which A is true, for example), but it
can be either indeterminate or true. If A is indeterminate,
then AvA illustrates the first possibility, while Av-A
illustrates the second possibility. More generally, if A
and B are indeterminate, the AvB is true just in case the
union of the set of structures in which A is true and the
set of structures in which B is true is equal to the full
set of structures which interprets A and B; otherwise AvB
is indeterminate. fhis once again differentiates inter-
pretations by sets of structures from other interpretations
which allow a third truth value.
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CHAPTER II
In later chapters we will be discussing the ontolo-
gical commitments of theories. It is thus important here to
discuss the notion of ontological commitment. In doing this
we will also be introducing certain technical notions and
metaphysical presuppositions to be used in later chapters.
In particular a special notion of a world will be introduced
which plays an important role in later chapters. The dis-
cussion here follows the work of Michael Jubiel ([12], [13])
quite closely and is partly supplementary to and partly
critical of that work.
It is taken here as established that ontological
commitment is an intensional notion. In assuming this we
are siding with Cartwright [3], Jubien [11], (to a certain
extent) Parsons ([18], [19]), Scheffler and Chomsky [14]
against Quine ([23], [27]) who claims that ontological com-
mitment is a notion which belongs to the theory of reference.
What this means is that in stating conditions for the satis-
faction of 'T is ontologically committed to x' we need to
use some notion such as entailment, analyticity or possibil-
ity.
, )
With Jubien ^7e distinguish between commitment to
kinds and commitment to particulars. Intuitively, 'there
are people' carries commitment of the first kind, while
'Nixon exists' carries commitment of the latter kind. We
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a.L.so distinguish between de re and de dicto commitment to
particulars. Intuitively, 'Carter exists’ has a commit-
ment de re to Carter, but (given an "attributive" use of
the definite description 'the President') 'the President
exists' does not have a de re commitment to Carter, but does
have a de dicto commitment to there being a unique President.
The important difference here is that the latter theroy
places no restriction on who is the President, while the
former theory says that some particular individual exists.
Parsons considers (without endorsing) the following
criterion of commitment to kinds: ([19]: 74),
(*) X ' s ont°l°gically committed to kind k if T
entails that there are things of kind k. ~ ~
The analogous criterion of de re commitment is
:
(
,oV
) T is ontologically committed de re to a if
T entails that a exists. -
In what follows we will largely be concerned with discussing
this criterion of de re commitment. A few obvious remarks
about (**) are that it is unclear just what sense of 'entails'
is employed. For example, if we accept the equivalence of
'T entails g_' with 'in every possible world in which T is
true, £ is true' then corresponding to different senses of
'possible world' we will obtain different senses of 'entails'
and thus different versions of (**)
. It is also, of course,
conceivable that 'entails' is used in some entirely different
way.
. Further evaluation of (**) thus requires that more be
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said about how entails is being used. It is also unclean
what the ranges of the variables
'
T
’ and 'a' are which are
used in (**)
.
In later chapters we will be concerned with evalua-
ting the ontological commitments of certain formal theories
which are interpreted by sets of intensional interpretations.
Thus, it is natural to discuss (**) by restricting the range
of the variable ' T ' to such formal theories and then asking
whether there is some sense of 'entails' in which (**)
,
so
restricted, is true. In doing this we will also be forced
to say what the range of 'a' is in (**)
. We could then ask
whether there is some generalization of (**) which is true
when applied to a more general class of theories. Thus, we
proceed by introducing this formal method of intensionally
interpreting theories and then ask whether various versions
of (**) are plausible when applied to such theories.
Of course, primarily what we are interested in are
the ontological commitments of informal theories which
„
people actually hold. Initially at least it would appear
that it is only such theories which have ontological com-
mitments. From this point of view we regard the ontological
commitments of formal theories as derived from the commit-
ments of the informal theories they represent.
Now a given informal theory might be formalized in
number of different ways and different criteria of commitment
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might be required to give the correct results for these
different formal theories. For example, it might be that
informal theory T has two different formalizations T' and
T" and that there are two different criteria of commitment
C' and C" such that the commitments of t' relative to C'
and the commitments of T" relative to C" are precisely
those of T, but that applying either C' to T" or C" to T 1
gives incorrect answers. If we then think of the conunitments
of formal theories as relative to that of informal theories
they represent, then we need to ask not whether such and
such a criterion is correct absolutely, but whether it is
correct relative to a certain method of representing informal
theories as formal theories. This will be disucssed (and
an actual example given) later in this chapter.
Thus far we have spoken as if we can speak of the
ontological commitments of formal theories only relative to
informal theories they represent. From such a point of view
the only point of introducing formal theories is to introduce
some regimentation into discussions of ontological commit-
ment. In fact, there is another reason to introduce these
formal theories. In certain cases it may be controversial
just exactly what the ontological commitments of an informal
theory are. (The examples to be discussed at length in
this dissertation are mathematical theories.) Given this
we might want to discuss the ontological commitments of
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formal theories independently of whether they are representa-
tions of these problematic informal theories and only later
(and partly in the basis of what the commitments of the formal
theories are) ask whether the formal theories adequately
represent the informal theories. The assumption here which
we make is that the notion of commitment applies not only to
informal theories and to formal theories relative to some
translation, but also to formal theories outright. The reader
must judge whether or not. this is true. The claim here would
be that these formal theories are enough like informal
theories so that we can ask of them (outright) whether they
have or lack certain ontological commitments. If we can do
this, then we can ask whether or not certain criteria of
commitment for such theories are correct absolutely and not
just relative to informal theories they represent. Through-
out much of this chapter it will be this question of relative
correctness which will be considered. In later chapters,
however, the criteria developed here will be applied outright
to formal theories.
We take the notion of an intensionally interpreted
theory (IIT) essentially from Jubien, ([13]: 516-7), the
major difference from Jubien' s account being that we do not
treat constants a(sjrj.gid designators and also allow that
'
-
(Ex) (x=a) ' can be true at some worlds.
Thus, classical first order theories will be a
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subset of the class of theories defined here. The added
breadth gained by allowing certain constants not to denote
at some worlds is an advantage when we attempt to formally
represent informal theories such as 'God does not exist'.
In order to do this, however, a decision must be made con-
cerning how to treat non-denoting constants semantically.
We make the decision that for atomic predicates, Pn
,
a
sequence does not satisfy Pn (...a. ..) if a is undefined.
Otherwise the clauses in the definition of satisfaction
are the same as in the definition of satisfaction for
classical first order theories. Truth in a structure
then is just satisfaction by all sequences.
Using the notion of a quantificational model
structure K, R
, ^
we define an intensional interpreta
tion of a theory T to be an ordered set
/ 1 1 2 v
I = < A
; p , p , . . . ; p a , a ,...>'12 1 12 /
which satisfies the following conditions
: (1) for each H
in K, A(H) ct 1(H); (2) for each H in K and i, a^(H)eA(H)
if ou is defined at H (the cu are not in general total func
tions)
;
and (3) for each H in K and i, j_, P j ,
(H)c[I(H) ]
1
.
In general, we denote
<A(H);p
1
(H) .p'cH) , . . . ;p
2
(H)
,
. .
.
;a, (H) ,a (H) , . . \'12 1 2 ~ /
l /
by ' 1(H)'. We then—define : a sentence is true at a world
H if it is true in 1(H).
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A (H) is the range of the quantifiers at H. It may
be a proper subset of Y (H) if we do not want the quantifiers
to range over all the things which exist at a world (as for
example is the case in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the
quantifiers of which range only over sets)
.
note was the facilitate the representation of such theories
as 'God does not exist'
. If this is going to be interesting,
we will want ' - (Ex) (x=g) ' to be true at some worlds. In
order to do this, a free logic should be adopted for dealing
with ITT's.
simply assigning extensions to predicates and denotations to
constants, predicates are assigned functions from worlds to
extensions and constants are assigned partial functions from
worlds to denotations. Roughly speaking, an intensional
interpretation could be thought of as a function from worlds
to extensional interpretations.
(**) is plausible when applied to IIT's. We might then make
(**) more precise then by saying
The justification for allowing constants not to de-
The point of this definition is that instead of
We are then interested in seeing if some version of
(1) an IIT, T, is ontologically committed de re to
a if aeT (H) for every H at which t is true.
The analogous version of (*) would be
(2) an IIT, T, is ontologically committed to
kind k if for every H at which T is true, the
set o:F things which are of kind k at H is non-
empty.
—
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Whereas (1) is well-defined for any IIT, this is not
so foi (2) . In order to apply (2) we need to ask whether
there are things which are of kind k at H for worlds H at
which T is true. This, however, will not make sense for
ITT's which are defined relative to certain model structures.
Let me give an example before moving to the general
point
. Consider the model structure
\
0 » ( ® , 1 } » (0,1}x{0,1}^>, {<0, (Nixon, Ford })>
, <1, (Nixon }^}
Then define an intensional interpretation for a theory whose
sole non- logical axiom is ' (Ex)Fx' as follows. For each H,
let A(H)=1(H) and let the interpretation of 'F' also be 1(H)
We have now specified an IIT. Note that there is no
trouble applying (1) to this theory. All that we have to
do is to ask whether, for example, Nixon is in 1(H) for
every H at which the theory is true. He is and so according
to (1) this theory is committed de re to Nixon (though not
to Ford)
.
Ask now whether this theory is committed to the kind
politician. In order to do this we need to find out if Nixon
is a politician in the world 1. Is he? There is no saying
because in specifying the IIT we did not have to say whether
Nixon is a politician in 1.
The moral is that we can only apply (2) to IIT's
^hich are defined relative to model structures for which we
can ask for arbitrary kinds k and worlds H whether there are
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things of kind k at H. That is, we need to be able to ask
not only whether arbitrary sentences of the object language
are true at worlds (we get that when we define the IIT) but
we also need to be able to ask whether sentences of the
metalanguage, e.g. 'there are things of kind k at H'
,
are
true at the worlds in the model structure used to define
the IIT.
For many purposes, e.g. defining validity, we need
only the technical notion of an object language sentence
true at a world in a model structure. For purposes
of assessing the ontological commitments of theories in
accordance with (2) , we need the informal notion of a sen-
tence of the metalanguage being true at a world. What sort
of things are such that sentences of the metalanguage are
true at them? It is natural to turn here to the metaphysical
notion (as opposed to the purely technical notion needed for
defining validity) of a possible world. Sentences of the
metalanguage are true at possible worlds (in a metaphysical,
but not a technical, sense of 'possible world').
In short, for the purposes of assessing ontological
commitments in accordance with (2)
,
it appears that we need
a notion which is much like the metaphysical notion of a
possible world usedj for example,, by Plantinga. It might
then be proposed that we apply (1) and (2) only to IIT's
which have been defined relative to the model structure the
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worlds of which are the metaphysically possible worlds.
If this approach is taken, there is no reason to
believe that (1) is an adequate criterion of de re commit-
ment. There may well be things which exist in every meta-
physically possible world. If so, (1) will imply that every
IIT is committed de re to each of these necessary existents
.
Note that we are making a double point here. First, this
argument shows that (1), so understood, is inadequate because
there is no way of interpreting informal theories as formal
theories in such a way that (1) applied to the formal theory
implies that that formal theory has exactly the de re commit-
ments that, intuitively, the informal theory has (assuming
there are necessary existents). Second, apart from con-
siderations of representing informal theories, it is un-
acceptable that every IIT should be committed de re to, say,
God.
We can then either give up (1) or look for a dif-
ferent model structure. In fact, there is independent reason
to look for a different model structure. Even if there are
abstract entities which metaphysically necessarily exist, we
might still want to consider the ontological commitments of
theories which imply that there are no abstract entities,
e.g. 'there are no abstract entities'. Even if God neces-
sarily exists, we (might still want to consider that ontolo-
gical commitments of theories which imply that there is no
God.
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In order to meet these desiderata, we want to define
IIT relative to a structure which embodies in some sense
a broader notion of possibility that the notion of meta-
physical possibility. This point is also made by Jubien
([13]: 527-8), who does not, however, say what that model
structure would be. What follows then can be understood as,
among other things, a supplement to Jubien' s theory of com-
mitment
.
What do we want of such a model structure? At least
this: for every set of entities there is a world at which
all and only the members of that set exist. We also want
to let there be worlds at which, to take the example just
given, there are concrete entities but no abstract entities.
We also want a model structure relative to which for ar-
bitrary kinds k we can say whether there are things of kind
k at a given world.
Typically, we will also want to specify an IIT by
saying things like, "for every world H, let the interpreta-
tion of ' Bxy ' at H be the set of ordered pairs <^x, such
that at H x is the brother of y. " Thus we need not only to
be able to specify whether there are things of kind K at H,
we also need to be able to specify the interpretations of
the predicates o-f the language in the wholesale fashion just
indicated. Note that this cannot be done within the approach
taken here if we take the technical notion of a world dis-
cussed earlier. If we used that notion, essentially the
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most that could be done would be to give a piecemeal inter-
pretation for the predicates, e.g., "at H, let the inter-
pretations of ' B ' be { (a,^> .^b.a^
,
at H
2 ,
let
. . .
"
A final condition is that "kind-necessities" be
preserved in every world in the model structure. I follow
Quine [24] and Jubieri ([12]: 86-7) in thinking that the
theory 'there are fish' has a commitment not only to the
kitid f isn but also to the kind animal. Now if we are to
evaluate commitment to kinds in accordance with (2)
,
this
means that if something is of the kind fish at a world H,
then it must be of the kind animal at H.
The proposal to be advanced here attempts to meet
these conditions by making use of the notions of a kind,
a property and metaphysical possibility. One might con-
ceive of a reduction of this rather liberal set of meta-
physical notions as follows. Kinds are simply certain
properties and if the only properties which are of interest
in this context are those expressed by English predicates,
then properties could be reduced to predicates. I have no
suggestion as to how to reduce the notion of metaphysical
possibility.
A world H relative to a language L is then defined
as an ordered pair /x,M^ where (1) x is a set and (2) f
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is a function which maps each kind to a subset of x (the
set of things of kind k at H) and which maps each primitive
predicate 'Pn ' of L to an ordered pair <EV> where Pn is
an n-ary property (the meaning of 'Pn ') and y_ is a subset of
x
n (the things which have Pn at H) . f must meet the following
conditions
:
(a) for every member z of x there is a kind k such
that zef (k)
;
(b) for any set S, S' of kinds and thing z, if
z_ef (k) for each k in S and it is metaphysically
necessary that if something is of each of the
kinds in S, then it is of at least one of the
kinds in S'
,
then for some k' in S'
,
z_ef (k' )
,
This construction relies on the assumption that
there is a set of all kinds. If there were no such set, then
the functions f used to define worlds would not exist. I
am unsure as to whether this assumption is justified since
I am uncertain what some of the important properties of
kinds are. For example, is the "negation" of a kind a kind?
What about disjunctions? Is being Nixon a kind? I am not
sure. If this assumption is unjustified, the definition of
a world would have to be altered; perhaps along the lines of
the definition of an appropriate model structure given below.
Annther question is: What things are members of x,
where <^c,f^ is a world? Clearly anything which actually
exists could be a member of such an x. The issue here is
whether there are non-existent entities and, if so, whether
such entities are members of sets. If both of these con-
ditions are satisfied, then we might well want such entities
to be the members of some x, where (x, f^> is a world. Doing
this would allow for the possibility of having de re com-
mitments to non-existent entities. I have deliberately left
the constructions in this chapter neutral between whether or
not non-existent entities figure in the worlds we define.
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(c) for any primitive predicate 'Pn ’ of L, kind k
and thing z, if f ( ' Pn ' ) =^
n
,
and
. . .
^52£n-l^-l ’^n-i l) and it is meta-
physically necessary that for all x ,’ x ,
. „
-1 '
—
n-1 ’
—
1
- •K
n _ 1
stands in the relation
P then z is of kind k, then zef (k)
.
(a)
-(c) are intended to force f to preserve kind-necessities,
intuitively (a) and (c) are supposed to force things into
some kind or other and (b) is supposed to keep them in the
correct kinds given that they are in one given kind. (c)
is also added so that, for example, (a natural formalization
of) ' (Ex) (Ey) (XE2.) ' might be committed to the kind set.
Some consequences of (b) (not had by its simpler
sub-case: if zef/k) and it is metaphysically necessary that
anything of kind k is of kind k'
,
then z£f (k
' ) ) are
:
(i) assuming that necessarily all rational animals
are humans, but not necessarily all rational
things are humans, if ze f (rational) and
zef (animal ) , then zef (human)";
(ii) If ycx, then either zef (concrete) or
zsf
(
abstract ) . (This result also relies on
la)
•
(a) forces everything to be a member of
some kind and (b) forces the member of any
kind to be either concrete or abstract. We
explicitly rely on (ii) in Chapter III where
it is argued that if there are infinitely
many things at H, but only one concrete thing,
then there are abstract things at H.
It would now be natural to let <^G, K, R^>, ¥ be defined
by stipulating that K=the set of all worlds; R=KxK; ¥(H)=x,
where H=^x, f^> and G= (y_, f^> where y=the set of things which
actually exist and for each kind k, f(k)=the set of things
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which actually are of kind k.
Such a natural approach will, however, lead to
paradox. I assume that the set theory used in defining this
model structure is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with individ-
uals. Then there is no set of all sets. Therefore, there
is no set y which is the set of things which actually exist.
Therefore, G does not exist. Also there are kinds, e.g. set
such that there is no set of all the things of that kind.
Thus f (where G=<^y, f)) is only a partial function. Further-
more, there is a difficulty with K even apart from the dif-
ficulty with G: there will be no set of all worlds. This,
of course, also affects the specification of R and ¥
.
This is quite a serious problem. On the one hand,
if (1) is to be applied as a criterion of de re commitment,
there must be many different kinds of worlds. This was seen
above where it was noted that there is no reason to believe
that (1) is adequate if we consider only the metaphysically
possible worlds. On the other hand, paradoxes must be
avoided.
The most elegant solution would be obtained if there
was a clearly understood theory which allowed there to be
totality which "contained" all sets and which allowed such
totalities to be "members". of other totalities. (Thus G
is a totality which is a "member" of K which is also a
totality.) In the absence of such a theory a slightly
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complicated set-theoretical construction is required.
On this approach it is natural to define G and K
m such a way that they are guaranteed to be sets, but to
put enough conditions on K to guarantee that the members of
K reflect the important properties of all the worlds. That
is just how we proceed. Proceeding
. in this way forces, how-
ever, giving up speaking of the model structure (relative
to a language)
. Instead we define the notion of an appro -
priate model struxture.
In an appropriate model structure G= where x
is simply some set of things which actually exist and for
all z. in x and kinds k, zpf(k) if z is actually of kind k.
This guarantees that G will be a set. G is, roughly, a
iragment of what would ordinarily be regarded as the actual
world. In an appropriate model structure K is simply some
set worlds which meets the conditions below. As before
R=KxK and T (H)=x, where H=^x, f^.
We require that K satisfy:
(Rl) For any mutually disjoint sets a, b, it is not
the case that in every H in K in which all of
the members of a exist, all of the members of
b exist.
(R2) For any sets S, S' of kinds, if there is a
world at which all of the members of S are
exemplified, but none of the members of S'
are exemplified, then there is an H in K~
where H=(x, f> and for every k in S, f(k),M
and for every k' in S' f(k')=j5\
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(l-v3) For anything x and kind k if there is a world
at which x is not of kind k and there is a
world H in K at which x exists, then there is
a world in K at which x is not of kind k.
(Rl) is designed to guarantee that there are no "ontological
dependencies" in K: saying that some set of things exists
will not guarantee that some other thing exists. (R2) and
(R3) are designed to guarantee that the only kind dependencies
that there are in K are those which exist throughout all the
worlds
.
It is important to verify that K in fact is a set.
(It might be thought that (R1)-(R3) force K to be too large
to be a set.) This is easily done. One way of showing this
is to begin with enough worlds to satisfy (R2) and then add
worlds to that set so as to satisfy (Rl)
. Adding worlds can-
not keep the resultant set from satisfying (R2)
. Finally
we add worlds so as to satisfy (R3)
. The set achieved
thereby clearly i£ a set and also satisfies these three
conditions
.
Is an appropriate model structure the general sort
of model structure we seek? (We, of course, obtain a partic-
ular model structure relative to a language by assigning
meanings to the predicates of that language.) First, note
that we wanted a model structure relative to which we could
ask whether there ar$ things of kind k at H for arbitrary
kinds k and worlds H. This notion (which we have already
used in stating the conditions above) is now easily defined:
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there are things of kind k at H (H=<4, f^> if f(k)^0.
An appropriate model structure also embodies the
broad notion of possibility we need for discussing ontologi-
cal commitment. First, (Rl) guarantees that there are no
ontological dependencies. Second, (R2) implies that there
are worlds at which there are concrete things, but no ab-
stract things. On the other hand, in any world
at which there are fish there are animals. Note also that
by (R3) for no thing x and kind k is x of k at every world
at which it exists (provided that it is not metaphysically
necessary that everything is of k ) . So, for example, in
some world Nixon is not of the kind human
,
nor even of the
kind concrete entity
. We could summarize this by saying
that an appropriate model structure preserves kind-neces-
sities
,
but not individual-necessities.
This implies that 'Nixon exists' (interpreted in
the obvious way as an IIT) is not committed to the kind
human according to (2). Is that correct? I think that
it is, but this is. a difficult case. If one thinks that
it is incorrect, the opposite result can be achieved by
adding a new condition which must be met by the functions
f used to identify the worlds. This condition would be
:
(R“) For any set of kinds and member z of x,
if it is metaphysically necessary that Xf
z. exists
,
then it is of one of the kinds
in S, then z is a member of f(k) for some
lc in S.
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Note also some oddities of the concept of a world
which I propose we use for evaluating ontological commit-
ments. If we suppose that being an animal and being a
vegetable are kinds, then on the definition of a world given
above there will be worlds at which something is both an
animal and a vegetable. In fact, there is nothing to keep
something from being both a vegetable and a non-vegetable
at a world (assuming that the latter is a "kind)
.
I do not think that this result has any undesirable
consequences for ontological commitment. In fact, it has
the desirable consequence that we can evaluate the ontological
commitments of the rather strange theories which may, in
fact, be held. This result simply indicates that a model
structure which is appropriate for considerations of
ontological commitment might not be appropriate for other
purposes. In any case, this result could easily be blocked
by adding a new condition (which is easily stated) which
must be met by the functions f used to identify the worlds.
Adding this condition would not, as far as I can tell,
affect our further discussion of ontological commitment.
Note finally the consequences if we have a
model structure relative to a language containing a
two-place predicate ' Bxy ' and if that predicate is
assigned the property brother by the worlds of the
model structure. Then there will be worlds at which
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both I and my actual brother exist, but are not brothers.
There will also be worlds at which I have a brother, but
(assuming that having a parent is a kind) I have no parent.
If, however, it is metaphysically necessary that if some-
thing has a brother then it is an animal, then (c) implies
chat in any world in which I have a brother I am an animal.
I do not think that we need conditons beyond (a) - (c)
,
but it is important to see that the approach outlined here
is fairly flexible. Such conditions should be added only
if they are needed to give the correct results for ontologi-
cal commitment. Roughly speaking, we want to impose minimal
structure on these worlds so as to be able to evaluate the
commitments of as many theories as possible.
Michael Jubien has raised some powerful objections
to (1) ([13]: 518-9). I want now to see just how convincing
Jubien' s objections to (I) are if we apply (1) to IIT's
defined relative to the model structure we have just described.
(Of course, Jubien did not consider (1) restricted in this
way, so that we will not directly be criticizing his claims.)
Jubien claims that although an IIT may "say nothing
about" some thing, that thing might "happen" to exist in
every world at which that theory is true. In such a case
(1) would imply that the IIT is committed de re to that
thing in spite of the fact that intuitively the IIT does not
say- enough about that thing to be committed to it. While I
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think that this point is correct when applied to IIT's de-
fined relative to arbitrary model structures, it is not
clearly correct when applied to the particular case we are
considering. It will be useful to distinguish two sorts of
this "inflated domain" counterexample to (1)
.
(i) Necessary beings
. If there is anything which
exists in every '¥ (H) that thing will exist in every y(H) at
which an IIT is true, regardless of whether that IIT says
anything at all about that thing.
Clearly, however, there are no such necessary beings
in an appropriate model structure ^G, K, Thus, there
can be no such inflated domain counterexamples to (1) given
our restriction.
(H) Popping-up entities
. Even if something does
not necessarily exist, it might "pop up" (exist) in every
H at which an IIT is true, regardless of whether that IIT
says anything at all about that thing. Here is an example
of this:
Let the sole non-logical axiom of T be '(Ex)Fbc'
. De-
fine I by letting A (K) = ii/ Qp) for every H and letting ' F ' be
assigned the set of things which are cows at H at any world
H at which Nixon exists and letting ' F' have the null ex-
tension at any world at which Nixon does not exist. Then,
committed de re to Nixon.
(1) might be rejected on the basis of such a case
on the grounds that <^T, I^> lacks the syntactic means of
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picking out Nixon and that a necessary (though not a suf-
ficient) condition of a theory's being committed de re to,
say
,
Nixon is that it have the syntactic means of "picking
2
out" Nixon.
I do not think this example conclusively shows that
(1) is inadequate. Let me introduce a new predicate into
English. We say, x is an F if x is a cow and Nixon exists.
Now consider the informal English theory 'there are F's'
.
Given the meaning of 'F', this theory is, intuitively,
committed de re to Nixon. But furthermore, there is nothing
wrong with representing this informal theory as the IIT
(T_, I
^
lately defined. If so, then it is not obviously un-
acceptable for ^T,
^
to be committed de re to Nixon.
In fact Jubien's own criterion fails to accord with
this principle. Let the sole non-logical axiom of T be
(Ex) (Ey) (xdy & (z) (Fz£-fr z=x v z=y) ) . Define I by letting
aXh)='F(H) for every H and letting the extension of ' F ' be
{Nixon, Ford} in any world at which those two men exist and d
otherwise. Then Jubien's criterion (5) implies that (T,
is committed de re to both Nixon and Ford. Yet given that
\T ’ 1.7 lacks the syntactic means of picking out either of
these men, Jubien's principle implies that /T, I) should not
be committed to either of these men. N '
I suggest the following criterion as according with
this principle. (Of course, I do not endorse this criterion.)
(5') /t, i') is committed de re to x if
ij there is a theorem (E.'xyA of T and x is the unique
satisfier of A in every H at which <*T, Is) is true and
ii) for every y, if x is existentiairy dependent on
y, there is a theorem (E!x)B of T and y is the unique
satisfier of B in every H at which /T
,
iy is true.
Clause ii) is added to deal with the problem with abstract
entities which motivates Jubien to move from his (4) to (5)
.
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In other words, (T, is an adequate (I do not claim
that it is the only adequate) formal representation of an in-
formal theory which has a de re commitment to Nixon. Thus
it is not a conclusive objection to (1) that it implies that
<r. is committed de re to Nixon.
Let us say that the informal predicate
' F ' hides
commitments. (A non-contrived example of such a predicate,
which was pointed out to me by Parsons is 'is British'.)
The example just considered then suggests a general answer
to the inflated domain objection to (1) . The answer con-
sists in saying that any apparent inflated domain counter-
example to (1) can be explained as involving a theory which
is an acceptable formal rendering of an informal theory which
has a predicate which hides commitments.
Note that both Jubien's criterion of de re commit-
ment (5) and my revision of it (5') imply that <^T, is
not committed de re to Nixon. Thus Jubien must find some
other way of representing the informal theory 'there are
F's_'
.
There is no problem here (in this case, at least).
Roughly speaking, in order to apply Jubien's criterion,
this theory should be represented as an IIT whose axiom is
(Ex)Cx & (Ex) (x=n) ' with 'C' interpreted to mean cow and
'n' treated as a name of Nixon. The general maxim to
follow in representing informal theories which may involve
predicates which hide commitments if Jubien's criterion is
to be applied is to "reveal as much structure as possible".
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Thus we would represent 'Tom is British' by first expanding
this theory to 'Tom bears R to Great Britain' (where R is
whatever relation it is that someone bears to Great Britain
if he is British) and then representing that theory just as
you would think you would. As we have seen, not all of the
structure of an informal theory need be revealed in order
to apply (1).
^-^ion s criterion and (1) thus give different re-
sults for a given IIT. In particular, if <^T, p is committed
de re to x according to Jubien's criterion then (1) implies
that it is committed de re to x, but the converse does not
hold in general.
The above remarks suggest, however, that insofar as
what we are interested in is the commitments of informal
theories, then the differences between (1) and (5) ((5'))
may be unimportant. As noted earlier, we can view the pro-
cess of evaluating the commitments of an informal theory as
consisting of two components. First there is the trans-
lation component whereby the informal theory is rendered
as an IIT. Then there is the criterion component whereby
the commitments of the formal theory are evaluated.
Iri the example above, we have seen that pairing
(1) with one translation procedure and pairing (5) with
another translation procedure give precisely the same re-
sults for the informal theory 'there are F's'.
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If what is taken to be important is the evaluation
of the commitments of. informal theories, then is there
any interesting difference between (1) and (5)? Or do the
differences between (1) and (5) cancel out (in the case of
informal theories) because different translation procedures
can be used in applying these criteria?
It would be impossible to answer this question
affirmatively until we bad specified the respective trans-
lation procedures more carefully. There may, however, be
reason to answer this question negatively if we assume that
any IIT is a countable theory. Then it is an easy conse-
quence of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem that (5) implies that
no IIT is committed de re to more than countable many things.
(This is even more obvious in the case of (5').) However,
an IIT could have a de re commitment to uncountably many
things according to (1)
.
Thus, if there is an informal theory (someone might
think that set theory is an example) which has a de re com-
mitment to each of uncountable many things (not just a com-
mitment to there being uncountably many things)
,
then there
will be no way of representing this theory as an IIT and
then applying (5) to gain the result that this IIT is com-
mitted de re to uncountably many things. There is no
a priori obstacle to gaining this result with (1)
.
It is my suspicion that this is the only interesting
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difference between (1) and (5) concerning informal theories.
For the time being, however, I want to limit myself to the
fairly modest claim that Jubien's objection to (1) is not
conclusive if we limit our consideration to IIT's defined
relative to the model structure we have defined; by re-
garding certain IIT's as renderings of informal theories
wmch have predicates which hide commitments we can explain
why the apparent inflated domain counterexamples to (1) need
not be regarded as genuine counterexamples.
I thus propose (1) as a criterion of de re commit-
ment. besides the fact that it is in some sense the most
obvious criterion and also that it is not vulnerable to in-
flated domain counterexamples, I have another reason for
adopting (1) . In what follows, we will be concerned with
evaluating the commitments of certain formal theories. We
will, largely be concerned with showing that these theories
do not have certain commitments. By applying (1) which is,
as has been noted, a more liberal criterion than. (5) is
when applied outright to formal theories we make the claim
that uhese formal theories do not have certain commitments
less controversial. (I would claim that any more liberal
criterion cuan (1.) is clearly too libera.1.) If one thinks
.mat (5) (or (a )) j.s adequate, then it should be applied
and it will be seen that if an IIT is not committed to x
according to (1)
,
then it is not committed to x according
to (5) ((5')). Thus, there are purely strategic reasons for
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accepting (1) for the purposes of the work to be pursued
here
.
I also propose that (2) be accepted as the criterion
of commitment to kinds. What about de dicto commitment?
Given the way we have proceeded thus far, it is natural to
regard de dicto commitment as a relation between an IIT and
an individual property. (An individual property is a prop-
erty which is exemplified by at most one thing at any world.)
Following the line suggested by (1) and (2), we then say
(3) (T, p is committed de dicto with respect to
an individual property P if P is exemplified
at every world at which
, 1^
is true.
It is important to note how (3) depends on our definition
of a world. On our definition, relative to a language L
we can speak of the kinds that are exemplified at a world
and also of the properties expressed by the primitive pred-
icates of L at a world. On the basis of this we can ask,
for example, whether the individual property: being the
unique thing which is not-P and of kind K (if P is a property
which is expressed by some predicate of L) is exemplified
at a world.
Extending (1)
, (2) and (3) to AIL' s and MAIL'S
.
Given the intensionality of ontological commitment, in order
to assess the ontological commitments of theories inter-
pieted as AIL's or as MAIL's, we need to provide intensional
versions of AIL's and MAIL's. Once this is done, (1), (2)
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and (3) apply immediately.
Whereas an AIL is interpreted by a set of (exten-
sional) structures, an intensional AIL (IAIL) is interpreted
by a set of intensional structures in the sense of
' inten-
sional structure’ defined at the outset of this chapter.
Thus an IAIL is an ordered pair (l, $} where L is a first
order language and $ is a set of intensional interpretations
for L. An IAIT is an ordered pair ^T, (h, $^> where T is a
first order theory and <L, $> is an IAIL. A sentence of
<^L, $N is true at H if it is true in 1(H) for every I in $.
Then, for example, a IAIL is committed de re to Nixon if
Nixon exists at every world at which the theory is true.
The definition of an IMAIL will be given in Chapter 4'.
Finally, in later chapters we will be interested in
asking how many things a theory is committed to existing.
We give a criterion for this as follows.- T is committed
to there being a-many things off in every world at which T
is true at least a-many things exist.
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CHAPTER III
We now consider the consequences of interpreting
mathematical theories as certain kinds of IAIT's. As noted
in Chapter One, in so doing we will be investigating' the
consequences of interpreting mathematical theories in the
way that Benacerraf and Field suggest. The motivating in-
tuition behind the approach to be studied here and in Chap-
ter Four is that a structure is acceptable for interpreting
a mathematical theory if it has the correct "structural"
properties. A mathematical theory is not the theory of one
such structure in particular. It will be the business of
Chapters Five and Six to clarify and attempt to support
this intuition. Unless a formal theory of mathematical
truth could be constructed which embodied this intuition,
however, this intuition would be of little value. It is to
such formal matters that we now turn.
(A) Consider a first order language L for arith-
metic whose sole predicate is the two-place predicate 'S'
(the successor relation)
. We provide this language with an
interpretation according with the intuition noted above.
In other words, we want to define a set $ of acceptable
intensional interpretations such that the IAIL <f. $) cap-
tures the intuition in question. To do this we give neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for an intensional inter-
pretation of be a member of $.
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An acceptable structure for arithmetic is, roughly,
an omega-progression. An acceptable intensional interpreta-
tion I_ for L is then one in which for any world H (1) if
there are only a finite number of things which exist at H,
]i(H)-^r(H)
; (2) if there are infinitely many things which
exist at H, 1(H) is isomorphic to the "standard model" of L.
The effect of (1) is that if there are not enough
things at H to form the domain of an extensional interpreta-
tion of L which has the correct structural properties, then
S. is given the null interpretation. Given such an inter-
pretation, Sxy is false for every assignment of members
to the domain of 'x' and ' y'
.
From (1) and (2) it follows that if Ie$, I (H) = <^T (H)
; ?£>
if there are only finitely many things at H. Roughly speaking,
the idea is that an acceptable intensional interpretation
picks out an omega-progression at H if there are enough
things at H.
The "standard model" of L is simply the model whose
domain is the set of natural numbers and whose assignment
to 'S' is the successor relation defined on the natural
numbers
.
Having now specified $, we say that a sentence of
(t. »>is true at a world H if it is true in every 1(H) for
1^ a member of $. Conditions (1) and (2) together guarantee
that' for every H
,( for every , 1^' , 1(H) is isomorphic to
I' (H) so that if a sentence of true in some 1(H) it is true
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m any I' (H)
. Thus, defining falsehood at H as falsehood
in all the 1(H) 's, every sentence will be either true or
false at every world. (Of course some sentences could be
true at one world and false at another.) There are no in-
determinate sentences.
(B) This technique may also be applied to the case
of set theory. Consider a formal language L whose sole
predicate is the two-place predicate
'
e'. We aim to provide
this language with a set $ of acceptable intensional inter-
pretations such that the resulting IAIL captures the intuition
that set theory is not the study of one particular structure,
but of what all structures which meet certain conditions
have in common.
Two difficulties confront the attempt to define $.
First of all, for each I in $ and H, 1(H) will be some set.
Hence the domain of 1(H) will be a set. But (in ZF) there
is no set of all sets and thus it seems that the domain of
^E(H) cannot contain all the sets. Thus it seems that it is
impossible to give an interpretation of L in this way which
captures the intention of set theory to speak of all sets.
This is a quite general difficulty which confronts
the attempt to provide a formal semantics for set theory.
It piesents no special problem for our approach. What it
indicates is that formally we may not be able to give the
"intended interpretation" of set theory, but only a model
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wlu_ch reflects that intended interpretation. We proceed
with that qualification on what we do
.
The second difficulty concerns possible structural
indeterminacy in set theory. In the case of arithmetic,
by contrast, it is generally thought that we have a clear
idea of the notion of a standard model of arithmetic. Such
a model must be isomorphic to the vonNeumann model of arith-
metic
.
Given' differing conceptions of sets and possible
unclarities within a given conception of sets, it is not at
all clear that any two acceptable extensional interpretations
must be isomorphic. In one such interpretation the GCH
might be true, while in another it might be false. One such
interpretation might even contain another as a set in its
domain
.
Once again, this is a general problem which presents
no special difficulty for the approach taken here. In
specifying $ we will in effect take a position on the ques-
tion of structural indeterminacy, but other positions on
this question can be accommodated within this approach. We
will consider two such positions.
First, we take the radical position that there is
no indeterminacy in set theory. Let C= {x|rank x <the first
inaccessible cardinal K’ }
;
{<^x, £> | rank x, rank v < K' & xey}
C thus is the model of set theory which consists of the sets
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of rank less than the first inaccessible cardinal. Then we
say that an intensional interpretation I of L is a member
of $ if for any H (1) if there are fewer than R(K' ) things
which exist at H, I (H)
= <Y (H) ; tf); (2) if there are not fewer
than R(K') things which exist at H, 1(H) is isomorphic to C.
Given this definition of $ and our customary defini-
tions of 'true' and 'false'
,
every sentence of L will be
true or false in every H. (As before, however, a sentence
could be true at one world and false at another.)
A second, more liberal, definition of $ allows I to
be a member of $ if for any ’H (1) if there are only finitely
many things which exist at H, I(H)=<T (H)
; 4y>; (2) if there
are infinitely many things which exist at H, then 1(H) is a
model of ZF. On this definition, the GCH, for example,
would be neither true nor false at any world at which there
are infinitely many things. In this case truth coincides
with provability.
(c) An interpretation can also be provided for a
combined arithmetic and set theory. The language in ques-
0
tion has the predicates 'S' ( ' is a set'), 'e', 'S' ('is the
successor of'), and 'N'('is a number'). An intensional in-
terpretation I is a member of $ if (the following condition
employs the second method for interpreting set theory just
noted) for any H (1) (if there are only finitely many things
which exist at H, then I^(H) =^ (H) ; <t> , <t> , <t> , (2) if there
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are infinitely many things which exist at H, then
I(H)=^F(H); A; B; C; where ^A, is isomorphic to the
standard model of arithmetic and where ^C, D) is a model
of ZF.
Many sentences are neither true nor false relative
to this interpretation (at worlds at which there are in-
finitely many things). First of all, the GCH and, more
generally, any sentence which is also a sentence of ZF and
which is independent in ZF will be neither true nor false
(at any such world)
. More interestingly, many sentences
which "mix" arithmetical and set theoretical language will
neither true nor false. ' 0=0 ' abbreviates a sentence which
is neither true nor false. The reason for this is that,
to speak for the moment as though 'O' and '0' are in the
language L, 'O' and ' 0' get assigned the same thing by some
I and $ and different things by other I and $. The truth
value of such sentences as '0=0' will be the major topic
of discussion in Chapter Five and it will be seen that the
fact that on the interpretation provided here '0=0' is
neither true nor false (once again, at worlds at which there
are infinitely things) may be an important consideration
in favor of viewing this interpretation as the correct in-
terpretation of arithmetic plus set theory.
(D) This approach may also be used to interpret the
languages appropriate for stating theories of impure sets.
Such a language might contain, for example, the predicates
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z
> §.
(
' is. a set') and 'A' (is an apple'). We say that
sn intensional interpretation X of this language is a member
of $ if for any H (1) if there are only finitely many
things which are non-apples and which exist at H,
I dO=<X (H) ; <t> ; the set of things which are apples at H^,
(2) if there are infinitely many non-apples which exist at
H, then I(H) =
<k
(H)
, ;
A; B; the set of things which are
apples at where 1(H) is a model of ZFA. ZFA is the
theory obtained for ZF by adding the axiom
(Ex) (Sx & (y) (yaxe>Ay)) an d rewriting the axioms of ZF by
replacing each occurrence of a universal quantifier
. .
.
(x) . . . by . ..
.
(x) (Sx.--^ ...)'. (We assume existential
quantifiers have been eliminated. ) This theory allows some
(even all) apples to be sets, but not all sets can be
apples
;
hence we have the requirement that there are
infinitely many non-apples.
(E) (D) also illustrates that this approach
has no difficulty dealing with "mixed theories". In terms
of the notion of partial signification, we can say that a
theory is mixed if some of its predicates partially signify
more than one extension and others partially signify more
than one extension. Intuitively, a mixed theory is one which
contains some mathenitttical and some non-mathematical
vocabulary. In (D) 'e' partially signifies more than one
extension (at a world), while 'A' partially signifies
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exactly one extension (at a world)
.
In general, to interpret mixed theories, if a
predicate
'
P
' does not, according to our philosophical
theory
,
partially signify more than one extension (in the
informal theory in which it is used), then for every I, I'
in $, 1(H) assigns the same extension to the predicate which
represents P as does I_' (H)
. The assignments to other
predicates may vary form I to I'.
It is significant that this approach handles mixed
theories so easily. In giving a theory of mathematical
truth, we must account not only for the truth of pure
mathematical theories, but also applied mathematical theo-
ries, e.g. theories such as physics. Such mixed theories
create important problems ror the approach to be considered
in the next chapter. Furthermore it is crucial that such
theories be interpreted.
The general approach towards the problem of inter-
preting mathematical theories to be considered in this chap-
ter should now be clear. It is an important question to
ask whether the interpretations we have given these formal
languages should be regarded as giving an account of the
associated informal languages. In giving an interpretation
for the language whose sole predicate is 'S', have we given
an account of the informal language whose sole predicate
is "is the successor of'?
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One way of beginning to answer this question is to
ask whether this interpretation gives the correct truth
values to sentences. The answer to this, at least in the
case of arithmetic, the case of set theory being less clear
given the possible problem of structural indeterminacy is,
Yes
.
On the other hand, there are many other ways of in-
terpreting mathematics (e.g. interpretations in set theory)
which also apparently give correct truth values. The ques-
tion which then arises is : why prefer one method of inter-
preting theories to another (provided these methods agree
on truth values)? Does it even make sense to speak of one,
rather than another, being the correct account? What is
there to choose between such accounts? In large part, such
questions are the business of Chapters Five and Six. How-
ever, here we may note that although two methods may agree
on the distribution of truth values, but differ in the
ontological commitments they imply a theory has.
Thus we now turn to consider what the ontological
commitments of mathematical theories are relative to inter-
preting them as IAIT's as discussed in this chapter.
To the IAIL defined in (A) above we add the following
axioms to obtain an IAIT.
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(1) (E.'x) (y) " Sxy
(2) (x)(E!^) Syx
(3) (x) (y) (z) ( Sxy & Sxz —> y=z)
( 1 ) — ( 3 ) together guarantee that there are infinitely
many "numbers". We can now discuss the ontological commit-
ments of this theory.
I claim that (i) this theory T has no de re commit-
ments and (ii) T is not committed to the kind abstract
entity . To take (i) first (which is, I think, intuitively,
clearly true) is there some thing which exists at every word
at which T is true? This amounts to the question whether
there is some thing, such that in any world at which it does
not exist only finitely many things exist. (The existence
of infinitely many things is sufficient for there to be
acceptable interpretations of this theory and T is true in
all such interpretations.) It is clear that there is no
such thing given the notion of a world defined in Chapter
Two
.
Now consider whether T is committed de re to some-
thing x. (Again, intuitively, there is no such thing.) We
have just said that there is a world H at which there are
infinitely many things and x does not exist. T is true in
each such world. Thus by the criterion developed in Chapter
Two, T has no de re- commitments. The reader should note
here, that we are relying in a substantive way in this
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argument on the notion of a world which has been defined.
If it is thought that in some sense the notion of a world
we defined is inappropriate for evaluating commitments,
this result would not follow. Note, however, that intui-
tively T has no de re commitments. Thus any correct criterion
of de re commitment should imply this. We may also view
this as confirmation of the theory of commitment stated in
Chapter Two.
(ii) There is a world at which there are no abstract
entities and there are infinitely many concrete entities.
Let H be such a world. In H each I in $ picks out a struc-
ture isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic (the
domains of which structures consist solely of concrete
entities). T is true in each such structure; hence it is
true in a world at which no abstract entities exist. Hence,
by our criterion of commitment for IAIT's, T is not com-
mitted to the kind abstract entity
.
We could say that a theory in nominalistic if (1)
it is not committed de re to any entity which is abstract
and (2) it is not committed to the kind abstract entity
.
(Recall that on our theory of commitment (2) does not imply
(1) although we did consider a modification of our theory
which would have had that result if we assume that any ab-
stract entity is essentially abstract.) A program of
nominalism in mathematics would then be successful if every
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mathematical theory could be interpreted so as to satisfy
(1) and (2) . Nominalism need not be understood in. this way
(in fact in Chapters Five and Six platonism (non-nominalism)
will be understood in a different way as the claim that
mathematical constants refer to abstract entities) but I
think this characterization does capture at least part of
what nominalism in mathematics has been taken to mean.
In this sense I claim that both arithmetic and set
theory, as here interpreted, are nominalistic. This then
raises the interesting possibility that if informal arith-
mecic and informal set theory (in some sense) should be
interpreted in this way, that both of these theories are
nominalistic
.
It is relatively clear how these results are ob-
tained. Roughly speaking, we allow anything at all to be
the '«$' of an acceptable structure for set theory. In other
words, we interpret ' <z5
' as partially denoting everything.
In such a way there is no one thing or kind of thing which
must exist in order for ' exists' to be true. Something
is mildly puzzling here, however, since in interpreting
arithmetic and set theory as we have we have used both set
theory and arithmetic, in our metalanguage. A suspicion may
arise here that this shows that a general program of nomi-
nalism in mathematics cannot be carried through in this way
for the reason that our meta-theory has non-nominalistic
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commitments. This issue arises throughout this disserta-
tion, for example, in our definition of a world in Chapter
Two, but perhaps most obviously in (A) above where .we "re-
ferred to" the standard model of arithmetic in specifying
the interpretation of a language. This same issue arises
m Chapter Four, where it is argued that this suspicion is
incorrect
.
A second important objection to the approach taken
here is as follows. Since informal arithmetic has 'one
exists' as a theorem, informal arithmetic has a de re com-
mitment to the number one. Thus either our formal interpreta-
tion of informal arithmetic is inadequate or we are incorrect
in claiming that this formal theory lacks de re commitments.
Similar remarks could be made concerning commitment to the
kind number
.
This is the same objection which was discussed in
the opening pages of Chapter One. Our answer to it is that
it is not a priori untenable to hold that in mathematics
there are and exists are used in special ways: ways
such that 'one exists' and 'there are numbers' do not have
^ commitment and a commitment to the kind number,
respectively.
A final, related, question concerns the applicability
of this technique of interpretation. Obviously any informal
theory could be represented as an I.AIT in such a way that
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the resultant formal theory lacks de re commitments. This
is disturbing in that it seems to open the door to holding
that no theory has de re commitments, which is, perhaps, an
absurd result. Much the same sort of thing bothered Quine,
I believe, in his worry that the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem
showed that every theory could be reduced to a theory of
numbers
.
In fact, interpreting theories as IAIT's is a general
technique. Any informal theory can be represented as an
j-AIT. ihe question is, however, whether they should be so
represented. Presumably some theories do have de re commit-
ments. Such theories should not be represented by formal
theories which lack such commitments. Thus what is shown
in this chpater in no way indicates that arithmetic lacks
de re commitments. That could only be established by
philosophical argument. The semantical technique introduced
here only shows how mathematics might be represented.
On the other hand, although these theories have no
de re commitments and are nominalistic, in another way
they do have quite heavy ontological commitments. For ex-
ample, the theory T of arithmetic has a commitment to there
being infinitely many things, in the sense that there are
infinitely many things in any world at which it is true.
Set theory, of cours^, may have an even heavier commitment,
depending on how it is interpreted. In particular, on our
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first interpretation given above, it has a commitment to
there being inaccessibly many things.
But even though these theories have these commit-
ments, they are nominalistic. Can a general program of
nominalism in mathematics be thus carried through by inter-
preting mathematical theories as IAIT's? We have already
noted one suspicion that it cannot, but in fact there is
an easier way of showing this program will not work.
If we consider just pure mathematical theories. I
*
think it is clear that this program can be carried through.
Difficulties arise, however, in certain cases of mixed
theories
. Consider the theory T' whose non-logical axioms
are the axioms of the theory T of arithmetic noted above
and the additional axiom (E!x)Cx (there is exactly one
concrete thing)
. The interpretation of the language of
this theory is such that I is in $ if for any H (1) if there
are only finitely many things which exist at H, then
I (H) (H)
; <t>\ the set of things which are concrete at
and (2) if there are infinitely many things which exist at
H, then I(H)= 4(H)
;
A; the set of things which are concrete
at H^> where A is isomorphic to the standard successor
relation defined on the natural numbers.
In any world H at which T' is true, there is only
one thing which is concrete at H, but there are infinitely
many_ things which exist at H. Thus T' is committed to the
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kind abstract entity. (Note that we are here relying on
one of the requirements which we placed on worlds in Chap-
ter Two: if something is not concrete, it is abstract.)
-
StiU does not have any de re commitments to abstract
entities, but it is not nominalistic (though it is nominalis-
tic m the sense of Chapters Five and Six in that it does
not construe mathematical constants as names) and this
commitment is not due alone to the non-mathematical
,
i.e.
there is exactly one concrete thing'
,
part of T'
.
Now this example is unrealistic in that T' is not
a theory which anyone is likely to hold. More realistic
examples are easy to find, however, If set theory is inter-
preted in the first way described above, then that theory
plus the axiom 'there are only denumerably many concrete
things
,
(represented in the obvious way as an IAIT) has a
commitment to the kind abstract entity
.
An even simpler case is the theory ZFA if we in-
terpret 'A' as having as its extension at a world the set
of concrete things at that world. ZFA then "says” there is
a set which contains all the concrete things and in any
world in which ZFA is true there are abstract things (since
otherwise the domain of a model of ZFA would be a member of
itself). Thus an impure set theory which asserts the exist-
ence of a set containing all concrete entities will be com-
mitted to the kind abstract entity
. Thus not every
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mathematical theory can be shown to be nominalistic by
interpreting it as an IAIT.
This point has relevance to a claim of Field's
Field claims ([7]
:
220-1) that we can account for arith-
metical truth while holding that there are infinitely many
physical objects but no abstract objects by interpreting
arithmetic in the way we have presented in this chapter.
We have seen that that claim is true, We have also seen,
however, that we cannot account for mathematical truth in
general (counting mixed theories as mathematical theories)
while holding this view. Thus the point about arithmetic
is only of limited interest.
Let us summarize the results of this chapter.
Mathematical theories, interpreted as IAIT's:
(1) can lack de re commitments to abstract en-
tities (even when they are not nominalistic)
;
(2) can allow such problematic sentences as
'0=<f>'
to be neither true nor false;
(3) have commitments to there being K things, for
some cardinal K;
(4) are not, in general, nominalistic.
CHAPTER IV
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In this chapter we investigate the consequences
of interpreting mathematical theories as IMAIT’s. The pri-
mary consequences for pure mathematical theories, so inter-
preted, are that if such theories allow the formation of
sentences which combine mathematical theories, e.g. '0=^',
then such sentences can be neither true nor false and that
no such theory has an ontological commitment to there being
at least one thing. In other words, it is shown how such
theories can be true in the empty world. (Note that given
the definition of a world given in Chapter Two there is an
empty world.) Two obvious corollaries of this second con-
sequence are that pure mathematical theories (so interpreted)
are nominalistic (in the sense defined in Chapter Three)
and that such theories have no de re commitments. This re-
sult should be of interest given widespread scepticism con-
cerning whether a nominalistic account of mathematics is
possible
.
Most of the work of this chapter is concerned with
extending this treatment of pure theories to mixed theories.
Difficulties are encountered, but I believe a solution is
found. The results for mixed theories could be summarized
by saying that unless the non-mathematical part of a mixed
theory is non-nominalistic
,
the entire thoery (interpreted
as an IMAIT) is nominalistic. More generally, the only
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commitments of such a mixed theory are those of the non-
mathematical part of that theory. Interpreting mathematical
theories as IMAIT's thus results in importantly fewer
ontological commitments than interpreting them as IAIT's.
Consider the theory T of arithmetic defined in Chap-
ter 3. The axioms and interpretation $ remain as before.
All that we change to interpret this theory as an IMAIT are
the definitions of truth and falsehood.
Instead of saying that a sentence is true at a world
H if it is true in every 1(H) for I in $, we now say that
it is true at H if for every world H' and I in $ , if I(H')^
‘yi
1 (H)
,
i£y then H is true in I (H
' ) . A sentence is false at
H if for every world H' and I in $ if I(H_^)#<V (H)^ then
it is false in I(H').
Some explanation would be helpful here. The idea
is that a sentence is true just in case necessarily it is
true in every structure in which 'S' has an extension with
the "right" structure. Given the way we have defined $, for
every I in $ and world H 1(H) either gives 'S' the null
extension or gives it an extension with the right struc-
ture, that is, it assigns it an extension isomorphic to
the successor relation of the standard model of arithmetic.
By looking only at I^(H) ' s where '£>' does not have the null
extension, we guarantte-e that we consider only the right
structures
.
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The reason why arithmetic, interpreted as an IMAIT
is not committed to there being at least one thing is clear.
Let H be the world at which nothing at all exists. The
theory of arithmetic just defined is true at H, because its
axioms are true in every I (H' ) which is not identical with
Thus this theory is true at a world at which
nothing at all exists. This implies that this theory is not
committed to there being at least one thing.
These results are straightforwardly applicable to
both set theory and the combined set theory-arithmetic
discussed above. In each case the interpretation $ remains
as before and only the definitions of truth and falsehood
are changed.
Clearly, neither of these theories is committed to
there being at least one thing. Furthermore, for the com-
bined set theory-arithmetic in which such sentences as
'0=0' can be formed, such sentences can be neither true nor
false. ('0=0' can also be interpreted to be true or false,
also.) This method of interpreting mathematical theories
as IMAIT 's can be applied to any mathematical theory, so
that we have now achieved what was promised in opening:
interpreting pure mathematical theories as IMAIT' s has
the counsequences that certain sentences which combine
mathematical languages can be taken to be neither true nor
false and that these theories so interpreted are not
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ontological ly committed to there being at least one thing.
As we have noted, this latter consequence implies that such
theories have no de re ontological commitments and that such
theories are nominalistic.
Again, it could be argued, as it was in Chapters One
and Three that since 'there are numbers' has a commitment
to the kind number
,
either our representation of arithmetic
is inadequate or we are incorrect in holding that this
formal theory lacks a commitment to the kind number. I
believe, however, that this objection was answered in Chap-
ter One.
This modal interpretation of mathematics thus has
some interesting consequences. However, if we attempt to
interpret theories which mix mathematical language with
language about ordinary concrete entities, difficulties
arise. This difficulty concerning mixed theories might be
expected. In giving a modal interpretation of mathematics,
we essentially look at all worlds to see whether a sentence
is true at a world. That does not create any difficulties,
because a true mathematical theory is necessarily true..
However, if we consider the truth value of a sentence about
concrete entities we definitely do not want to look at all
worlds to see if that; sentence is true at a world H, for,
roughly, it is facts which are peculiar to H which make
this" sentence true.
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To see this in a particular case, let us add to out
language of arithmetic the one-place predicates 'F' and 'N'
(to be interpreted as meaning: is a fish and is a number,
respectively.) To give a modal interpretation of the result-
ant language we specify $ and give a definition of truth.
An intensional interpretation I is a member of $ if for any
H, (1) if there are only finitely many members of y(H)
I(H) = {V(H)
; $ ; <t> ; the set of things which are fish are H^and
(2) if there are infinitely many members of T (H)
,
1(H) (H)
;
A; B; the set of things which are fish at where <(a, E^>
is isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic.
If we were to follow the general pattern of the
definition of truth for an IMAIT presented above, we would
say that a sentence of this theory is true at a world H if
for every H' and I in $ , if I(H' )±
^
(H)
; <t> ; <t> ; the set of
things which are fish at H^> then that sentence is true in
I (H
' ) .
This, however, will not work. Suppose that at H,
something is a fish. Then we want ' (Ex)Fx' to be true at
H on this interpretation. Unfortunately, for some I(H')
in which 'S' does not get assigned p, ' F' does get assigned
?S. In such an I (H
' ) , ' (Ex)Fx' is false. Thus, on the
proposed definition ' (Ex)Fx' is not true at H.
To solve this problem, let us think about what sort
of structure we, would want to examine in defining truth of
a sentence of this theory. Suppose that I (H)=/y (H) ; C; D;
l
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the set of things which are fish at h). ((c, might either
be ($>, ?L> or isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic.)
Tnen it appears that the sort of structure we seek would
be of the form: <^D, A, B, the set of things which are fish
at 5/* where 1(H) e: D and <^A, is isomorphic to the stand-
ard model of arithmetic. Let us call such a structure an
acceptable structure relative to H, F Then the definition
of truth at a world which we seek would be: a sentence is
true at H if for every I, I' and H’ if I
'
(H 1 ) is an accept-
able structure relative to 1^, H, then that sentence is true
in I
'
(H
'
)
.
The general idea here is to keep the extensions of
some predicates fixed. Let us call such predicates world-
bnund. The extensions of other predicates (essentially,
the mathematical" ones) are allowed to vary. Such predi-
cates we will call other -wor Idly . Then we also (in some
cases) need to consider a larger domain.
Now suppose that I(H)
= ^{a, b } , (a}V H, in
other words, is a world at which two things exist, one of
which is a fish. It is now easy to see that (E!x)Fx is
true at H, since in any acceptable structure relative to H
and I, only a is in the extension of 'F'.
Note, however, tl^iat (E.'x)-Fx is false, since in any
such acceptable structure there are infinitely many things
not in the extension of ' F '
.
This is neither surprising,
nor disturbing, since in order to make the mathematical
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sentences have the correct truth values at H, we need to
have the sentence which says that there are more than two
things come out true.
This fact does, however, point out a certain lack
of expressive power of this language. Somehow we would like
to be able to express 'there is a unique non-fish' by a
true sentence of this language, since, in at least one sense
this sentence is clearly true at H. In fact, this is easily
done by adding a new world-bound predicate 'E' to this
language. (
'
E
'
is supposed to suggest existence for reasons
that will soon be made clear.) In every 1(H), the exten-
sion of 'E' is equal to the domain of 1(H). In this way it
is like an existence-predicate. Since
’
E
' is world-bound,
however, it keeps the same extension when we move from 1(H)
to a structure acceptable relative to H, I.
Then it is easy to see that (E.'x)(Ex & - Fx) is true
at the two-thing world described above. In general, if we
want to speak only of what really exists at H we relativize
the quantifiers to ' E '
.
E then adds important expressive powers to this
language. In general, it may be useful to add such a
world-bound existence, predicate to the language used to
formalize mixed informal languages.
Note also that the sentences with only arithmetical
(other-worldly) predicates get the correct truth values.
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In any acceptable structure, the assignment to 'N' and 'S'
guarantees that, since that assignment ^A, B^> is isomorphic
to the standard model of arithmetic.
As for sentences which mix world-bound and other-
worldly predicates, consider (*) (x) (Fx v Nx)
. As we have
arranged things, (*) is neither true nor false at H. The
reason for this is that in some acceptable structures the
extension of N will be the domain of the structure, while
in other acceptable structures there are things which are
neither in the extension of 'F' nor in the extension of ' N ' .
(“) is a natural formalization of 'everything is a fish or
a number'. As such, it seems not unreasonable that (*) is
neither true nor false, but note that by slight and obvious
modifications of the definition of an acceptable structure
different results could be obtained. For example, by re-
quiring the domain of an acceptable structure relative to
the world H above be {a, b} the extension of 'N'
,
(*)
could be true at H. Note also that on both of these de-
finitions both (x) (Ex—^ Nx) and (x) (Fx —^ Nx) are neither
true nor false. Once again, however, different results are
easily obtained. This is desirable, since the truth values
of sentences which mix mathematical with non-mathematical
sentences are often difficult to ascertain. In this con-
text, I am more interested in exhibiting a general tech-
nique which can be accommodated to any philosophical stand
on these questions, rather than actually taking a stand on
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these questions.
This distinction we have made between world bound
and other-worldly predicates, though useful as far as it
goes, is not, however, adequate for dealing with all mixed
languages. Consider 'has at least brothers'. This is
a predicate which, intuitively, is non-pure at its first
place and pure at its second place. Let us call such predi-
cates mixed and adopt the convention of speaking of the places
of mixed predicates as being either pure or non-pure
. In
giving a definition of a mixed theory we will want to make
certain requirements on how the mixed predicates are inter-
preted, just as we put conditions on how the world-bound
predicates are interpreted.
Suppose for the sake of illustration that we are
dealing with a language having predicates
'
N
’ ,
'S', and
B to be interpreted as meaning is a number, is a successor
of and has^ at l_east brothers, respectively. Suppose
that I(H) = <T(H)
;
N; S; B^) where N is the extension of ' N
' ,
etc. What sort of a structure do we want to consider in
defining truth at H of a sentence of this language? Such a
structure will be of the form ^D, N'
;
S'; B^> where T(H)«D
and <N'
; SVis isomorphic to the standard model of arith-
metic. What requirements do we want to put on B
' ? The
following appear to be minimal requirements.
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This is intended to capture the idea that ’B' is non-pure
at its first place.
Also, note that 'B(x, 1)' abbreviates certain open
sentences of this language. Roughly speaking, we would like
to guarantee that if x satisfies 'B(x, 1)' in one acceptable
structure relative to H, I, then it satisfies 'B(x, 1)’ in
every acceptable structure relative to H, I.
We implement this requirement as follows. Let us
say that 'Py' is an M- sentence relative to a set g of struc-
tures if ’y' is its only free variable, it contains only
other-worldly predicates (in this case, 'N' and ’S')
and '(E.'y)Py' holds in every member of Q. Then we require:
if in some acceptable structure S relative to H, I, there
is an M-sentence 'Py' relative to the set of acceptable
structures relative to H, I, such that <^t,
y^> is in the ex-
tension of
'
B
' in S and y satisfies ‘Py’ in S, then there is
M-sentence ’P*y‘ relative to the set of acceptable struc-
tures relative to H, I, such that y satisfies ’Py’ in S
and every acceptable structure S’ relative to H, I there
is a z satisfying ’P*y’ in S' and such that (x, z^> satis-
fies
'
B
' in S'.
The idea here is that if ^x, y) satisfies 'B' in
some acceptable structure and y satisfies an M-predicate,
then there is some M-predicate which picks out correlates
of y in every acceptable structure including y itself in
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the given structure.
Let us move from these examples to a general defini-
tion of a mixed IMAIL. (In fact, pure IMAIL's can be under-
stood essentially as special cases of mixed IMAIL's, so
this is a perfectly general definition.) A mixed IMAIL is
an ordered triple (L, $, where L is a first order language
and $ is a set of intensional interpretations of L. We
assume an exhaustive and mutually exclusive division of
predicates into the categories world -bound
,
mixed and other-
worldly. Furthermore, we assume a specification of which
places of the mixed predicates (if any) are pure and which
are non-pure.
£ then is a three-place function which takes an
intensional interpretation I, a world H and a world H' into
the set of structures whose domains are a subset of y (H
'
)
and which are acceptable relative to H, I.
In general, we require g to satisfy the following
conditions. If S is a member of the domain of G(I, H, H')
then
,
(i) the domain of 1(H) is a
domain of S;
subset of the
(ii) the extension of any world-bound predicate
is the same in 1(H) as it is in S;
(iii) for any^jnixed predicate 'Pn ' and member S
of g(I, H, H'), if <a
L ,
. .
.
,
a^ is a member
of the extension of '
P
n
' in S
,
then
(a) if i a non-pure place of 'Pn
,
then a. is
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a member of the domain of 1(H)
;
) If for each i. which is a pure place
of 'Pn ', satisfies a predicate
'P. ' which is an M-predicate relative
t0
vJ H^eK ’ 51> H ' ) , then there are
predicates 'P*' relative to (J^^K
g(I, H, H') such that a^ satisfies
' P*' in S and for any S' in
g,(I, M.> M'), there is an n-tuple
<^bp • •
•
,
b^> which satisfies ' Pn'.in
S_' such that if i is a non-pure place
in 'Pn
,
then £u=b^ and if i is a pure
place, then b^ satisfies
'
P*
' in S'.
A sentence then is true at H if it is true in every
member of g,(I, H, H' ) . That is, it is true at H if
it is true in every acceptable structure relative to H. A
sentence is false if it is false in every member of
£(I. H, H').
To test this definition, we interpret an impure
set theory as a mixed IMAIT. To obtain such a theory we
relativize each of the axioms of ZF to a predicate 'S'
('is a set') and then add axioms asserting the existence of
impure sets. In this case we add the sole axiom
(Ex) (Sx & (y) (yex Cx) ) . (The set of concrete things
exists.)
To interpret this theory as an IMAIT we specify the
set $ of interpreting
1
'<Lntensional interpretations. I is in
$ if for every world H (1) if there are only finitely many
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non-concrete things which exist at H, then I(H)=<J(H); </>, </>;
the set of things which are concrete at h); (2) if there
are infinitely many non-concrete things which exist at H,
then l.(H)=^4'(H)
;
A; B; the set of things which are concrete
at where A is the extension of ’ Sj and where 1(H) is a
model of the impure set theory just stated.
' e' and 'S' as other-worldly in order to specify g. In
specifying g we will be saying what an acceptable structure
say that g(I, H, H
' ) is the set of S=x' ;y' ; z ' ; t' such
that S is a model of this theory, xcx'c.I(H' ) and t=t ' .
For example, if I(H)=^{a, b } ; <z$ ; 0 ; (a^ then an
acceptable structure relative to H, I will be of the form
theory and (a, b} e; D.
By our definition, we have guaranteed that each of
the axioms of this theory will be true at the world H just
described (under the given interpretation) . In fact that
theory will be true at every world. Another sentence which
is true at H is (E!x)Cx. (Elx)-Cx is false for the reason
we have seen above. We could adequately express 'there is
a unique non-concrete thing' by adding an existence predicate
' E' as described above-r (x) (Cx v Sx) and (x) (Cx —^ Sx) are
both- neither true nor false.
We then treat 'C' as a world-bound predicate and
relative to H, I is. In general, if I(H) = /x; y_; z; we
where this structure is a model of this
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Clearly, this theory can be true under this inter-
pretation at a world with any number of things. Thus this
theory is not committed to there being more than one thing.
This technique can be applied generally to impure set'
theories, so that we have the result that not only can inter
preting pure set theories as IMAIT’s yield theories without
commitments to pure sets, also interpreting impure set
theories as mixes IMIAT’s yield theories without commit-
ments to any sets. To take the crucial case, if rather than
adding an axiom asserting the existence of the set of con-
crete things to our modified ZF, we had added an axiom
asserting the existence of the unit set of Frege, the re-
sultant theory would have these commitments:
(1) a commitment de re to Frege;
(2) a commitment to there being at least one thing;
but not
(3) a commitment de re to the unit set of Frege;
(4) a commitment to there being at least two things
These points have relevance both to the scope of the
method of interpretation developed here and to the work of
Michael Jubien in this area. In a forthcoming paper [14]
and in published work [12] Jubien presents a theory of
mathematical truth which is close to that stated here. Al-
though his treatment oiljcombined and mixed mathematical
theories is different from ours, it is not too inaccurate
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to say that he proposes that mathematical theories be inter-
preted as IMAIT's. He then correctly draws the inference
that under this interpretation pure mathematical theories
have no de re commitments.
On the other hand, he makes an assumption that im-
plies that de re commitments to contain impure sets are pos-
sible. Apparently, he believes that although we can inter-
pret pure matnematical theories in such a way that they have
no de re commitments, it is not possible to interpret impure
set theories in this way.
The reason he thinks this is quite clear. In de-
fining an interpretation for impure set theory, in our meta-
language we are constantly "speaking of" impure sets, e.g.
each 1(H) is an impure set. It is apparently this fact
which Jubien has in mind in thinking that he needs to assume
that de re commitments to impure sets are possible.
This is an important problem which arises through-
out this work. It arose in Chapter Three when we wondered
whether interpreting mathematical theories as IAIT's could
be used as the means of carrying out a general program of
nominalism. At that point we defereed discussion of this
problem, so that What follows is intended also to answer
this objection as it arose in Chapter Three.
Where does this supposed commitment lie? It does
not lie with the object language impure set theory which is
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to bo int erpre 1 e d , for we have SG6n that we have 3 way of
interpreting this theory relative to which this theory has
no de re commitments to sets. It can only be then that the
meta-theory in which this theory is given has commitments
to sets. Whether it does though depends on how this meta-
theory is interpreted (in a meta-meta- language)
. The ques-
tion then is how to interpret the impure set theory which
is part of the meta-theory.
Our answer to this is clear: interpret that impure
set theory as an IMAIT. On such an interpretation the meta-
theory will be seen to have no commitment to sets (de re
or otherwise) despite the fact that it does "speak of" sets.
Just as although the object- language theory "speaks of"
impure sets, but has no commitments to sets, so too for the
meta- language . To sum up, the situation is this: no matter
what level we are talking at, it will appear that our talk
has platonistic commitments; by ascending to a meta-language
(with its apparent commitments) we show how to escape this
result.
This seems to underline an important aspect of our
approach to nominalism. It might be thought that the only
way of establishing nominalism would be to provide trans-
lations of, say, arithmetic into some chosen nominalistic
language. Such has (been the approach of many in this field.
For us, by contrast, nominalism is not a question
85
Oj- translation, but of interpretation. On our approach,
the nominalist can feel perfectly free to use "platonistic"
language without being able to eliminate this language. All
that he needs to do is to give an interpretation of this
language relative to which this theory is not committed to
numbers, sets, etc. In this chapter we have seen how this
can be done.
Just as in Chapter Three, the question of applica-
bility arises here. Any informal theory could be represented
as an IMAIT. Have we thus opened the door to holding that
no theory is committed to there being anything at all? Once
again, it is one thing to show that a theory could be
represented as an IMAIT and quite another to hold that it
ought to be so represented. There is some plausibility, I
believe, to holding that, say, set theory could be true
in the empty world. Part of this plausibility derives
from the idea that set theory would be true no. matter
what and that there might be nothing at all. The truth of
set theory, so to speak, does not depend on any particular
facts about, any world. Hence it is true in the empty world.
The truth of some non-mathematical theories, e.g. 'there
are horses' does depend on particular facts about a given
world. Hence such theories are not generally true in the
empty world, are not true no matter what and so should not
be represented by theories which would be true in the empty
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world. Thus
,
I am quite confident that the work of this
chapter cannot be used as a means of arguing that no theory
has any commitments.
A bit of clarification concerning the categories of
predicates would be helpful
. Roughly speaking, the other-worldly
predicates will be those which can appear in pure mathematical
theories. The world-bound predicates are those which can
appear in theories which do not contain any mathematics at
all. The mixed predicates are the other predicates. They
are predicates which can only appear in theories' having a
mathematical and a non-mathematical component. Note, how-
ever, that this is only a rough characterization since, for
example, this characterization allows '=' to be both a world-
bound and an other-worldly predicate.
To be more precise, consider an arbitrary place of
an arbitrary primitive predicate. Consider whether we want
to guarantee that any satisfier (at H) of that place must
actually exist (at H) . If so, and if this holds also for
any other place of that predicate, then we will classify
the predicate as being world-bound. If this does not hold
for any place, the predicate is other-worldly. All other
predicates are mixed. The places of a mixed predicate for
which the above condition does held are the non-pure places
(
of that predicate. The other places are the pure places.
Note that on this characterization '=' is an other-
worldly predicate. Note also that (as '=' shows) that the
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satis fier \,at H) of an other-worldly predicate may exist
H) , Those predicates are other-worldly only in the
sense that their satisfiers need not exist. Finally, it is
possible that for certain purposes a finer set of classifi-
Ccitions of predicates xvould be needed. It is clear, however,
that the given classification is exhaustive and mutually
exclusive
.
CHAPTER V
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In a well-known paper [2] Paul Benacerraf has argued,
"there are no things as numbers" ( [2 ] : 73). Benacerraf pro-
ceeds in arguing for this conclusion by first arguing that
numbers are not sets ([2]: 57-8); then he "extends" this
argument to show that numbers are not anything at all
([2]: 69-70).
In arguing that numbers are not sets, he asks the
question, of all the set-theoretic models of number theory
is there one which is identical with the "intended" model
of number theory, i.e. the model whose domain consists of
0, 1, 2, etc.? For example, if we let 'O' denote i and let
the successor of a set x be x(J{x}
,
we get a model of arith-
metic. Is 0 then identical with tf? Or is it one of the
other sets which is the denotation of 'O' in a model of
arithmetic?
Benacerraf says,
if there exists.
. . a "correct" account, do there
also exist arguments which will show it to be the
correct one? Or does there exist a particular set
of sets b, which is really the numbers, but such
that
. there exists no argument one can give to es-
tablish that it.
. . is really the numbers? It
seems altogether too obvious that this latter pos-
^-t^-tl-^-ty borders^ on the absurd. If the numbers
constitute one particular set of sets, and not
another, then there must be arguments to indicate
which ( f 2] : 57-8)
.
Just what is the argument? Let us use '*' to
abbreviate it can be shown that
' and ' S ' to abbreviate
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' is a set
'
.
Nov Benacerraf's premises could perhaps be expressed
as follows.
(1) S(0)-4 (Ex)(Sx & *(x=0.))
(2) - (Ex) (Sx & *(x=0))
(3) - S(0)
(1) is a rendering of the principle that if 0 is a
set, then there is a set x such that it can be shown that 0
is x. (2) simply says that there is no such x.
How does Benacerraf argue for (2)? He considers
the logrcist account of numbers which says that 0=(d} and
argues that there is no reason to believe that it is true
([2] : 58-62). Then he says that when this is seen, it is
clear that there is no reason to believe that any other
set-theoretic account of 0 is true. Thus what he has argued
(and what I am willing to accept is that
(4) -*(a=0)
is true whenever a is replaced by any standard name (e.g.
) of a set. But this does not show that (2) is true.
Suppose (4) is true for any such a. Even so, it could be
true that
(5) S(0) & *(0=0)
, ,
.
~
since 'O' is not a standard name of a set. If (5) is true,
(2) is false.
In arguing that both (2) and (5) and also (15) and
(18) below are contradictories, I assume that the inference
90
from *(
. .
.
0 . ..) to (Ex* ( . . . x ...) is valid. I think that
that inference is valid. For example, we would accept the
inference from “(0 is even) to (Ex)*(x is even). Such as
inference is not valid for all numerical terms, however.
Suppose, for example, that there is a non-constructive proof
that there are numbers with the property P. Assume also that
this non-constructive proof is the only means we have of
knowing that there are such numbers. In particular, we know
of no examples of numbers which have P. Then we could in-
troduce a as an abbreviation for 'the least number with
property P'
. Then we would have *Pa but not (Ex)*Px. If
we replaced a' with 'O'
,
however, the inference would be
valid.
Thus we might attempt another reconstruction of
Benacerraf ' s argument
.
(6) S(0)—> (Ex)*(Sx & x=0)
(7) - (Ex) *(Sx & x=0)
The conclusion of course is (3)
.
(6) again appears to be
a reasonable rendering of the principle Benacerraf states.
Does the evidence ((4)) Benacerraf presents show that (7)
is true? Yes, for assume (7) is false. That is, assume
(8) (Ex) *(Sx & x=0)
Now given the interpretation of '*' the only way for (8) to
be true is if
(9) ' *(Sa & a=0)
'
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is true for some substitution of a constant for a. But the
only substitutions for a which yield the truth of '*Sa' are
precisely those substitutions which do not according to (4)
yield the truth of ’*(a=0)'. Thus (9) is false for every
a and so (7) is true.
In fact, Benacerraf's argument can be simplified
here, for by an easy argument (6) implies
(10) S(0) *S(0)
and in arguing that (9) is false, we have established
(11) -*S(0)
Thus in its simplest form, Benacerraf's argument can
be seen as proceeding from (10) and (11) to (3). A slightly
more complicated version which is closer to the text proceeds
from (6) and (7) to (3). Note also that in accordance with
Benacerraf's intentions both of these arguments are easily
generalized to show that no number is a set.
Before turning to a consideration of whether (6)
and (1) are plausible, let us see how Benacerraf "extends"
his argument to show that there are no numbers. Benacerraf
says
,
I therefore argue, extending the argument that
led to the conclusion that numbers could not be
sets, that numbers could not be objects at all;
for there is no more reason to identify any in-
dividual number with any one particular object
than with any other (not already known to be a
number) ( [2 ] : 69)
.
How is this argument being extended? Consider the
simple ((10) and (11)) version of his argument that 0 is
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not a set. The natural way of extending this argument is
to say that if 0 is anything at all, then there is something
which is such that it can be shown to be 0
. More formally,
(12) (Ex) (x=0) -a> (Ex)*(x=0)
Benacerraf then might claim
(13) - (Ex)*(x=0)
The immediate problem here is that Benacerraf has no inde-
pendent way to show that the rather implausible (13) is true.
Thus far, however, we have ignored the parenthetical
comment which closed the last quotation. This comment sug-
gests that Benacerraf wants to strengthen the consequent
of (12) in some way. Perhaps his claim is
(14) ’ (Ex) (x=0) (Ex)*(Px & x=0)
'
is true for some replacement of 1 P ’ by a predicate which
does not already identify x as a number." Now this con-
dition could perhaps be stated as requiring that such a
predicate
’
P
' be such that 'for all x, if x is P, then x
is a number' is not analytic. But in order to block triv-
ial counterexamples, (e.g.
' self-identify : ) we should also
require that for all x, if x is a number, then x is P'
also not be analytic.
First of all, it is easy to be puzzled why Benacerraf
would call (14) an extension of either (6) or (10). In fact,
if Benecerraf wants to argue from (14) and
(15) '
-
(Ex)*(Px & x=0)
'
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is true for every 'P' which meets his condition, to
(16) - (Ex) (x=0)
his earlier argument actually leads us to doubt his claim
(15). Having already shown (3), he has established
(17) *-S(0)
-S meets his condition since 'all non-sets are numbers'
j-S false and since 'all numbers are non-sets' though true
according to Benacerraf is not analytic. Thus (17) together
with ’'(0=0) which is plausible and which is not something
Benacerraf can assume is false implies
(18) *(-S(0) & 0=0)
which is a counterexample to (15). Thus, so far from this,
second argument being an extension of his first argument,
the first argument actually undercuts the second.
Perhaps, however, it is not (14) which Benacerraf
means to defend. Perhaps, he means to defend the stronger
claim
(19) ' (Ex) (x=0) (Ex) *( (y) (Pyf-> y=x) & x=0) '
is true for some substitution of a predicate for ' P ' which
meets, "his condition. The point of (19) is that if 0 exists
it can be uniquely picked out in some way which does not
already identify it as a number. His further claim then,
of course, is that the consequent of (19) is not true for
any predicate which meets his condition.
Once again it is difficult to see that the
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considerations which might motivate acceptance of (6) or
(10) also would motivate acceptance of (19)
. Benacerraf
does not explain. In any case, it is doubtful that he can
show that the consequent of (19) is false for any. predicate
which meets his condition. Consider 'is thought about by
Tom
,
'is named by ' 0 '
'
,
'is proved by Tom to have some
property', and 'is a counterexample to the claim that all
universities have more than two students and all even num-
bers are greater than 1'. Each of these predicates meets
his condition and substituting any of them for ' p
' in (19)
could under the appropriate conditions make the consequent
of (19) true. I think then that we must conclude that at
least in this form, Benacerraf s argument for (16) is a
failure
.
Let us now consider (6) and (10) . Since we have
accepted (7) and (11), if either (6) or (10) is reasonable
to believe Benacerraf would have a convincing argument that
0 is not a set. First of all, what does Benacerraf say in
favor of these premises? He says that in saying what we
have rendered as (6) and (10),
I am no l committing myself to the decidability by
proof of every mathematical question--for I con-
sider this neither a mathematical question nor
one amenable to proof.
. . In awaiting enlighten-
ment on the true identity of 3 we are not awaiting
a proof of some deep theorem. Having gotten as
far as we Iqave without settling the identity of 3,
we can go no further. We do not know what a proof
of, that could look like. The notion of "correct
account" is Freaking loose from its moorings if we
admit of the possible existence of unjustifiable
but correct answers to questions such as this ([2]: 58).
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This is not very helpful. If 0 is a set why should
it be showable that it is a set? All that Benacerraf says
is that he does not defend (6) or (10) because he defends a
general principle that every truth can be shown to be true.
He does nothing to explain why this principle though not
plausible m general is plausible in this particular case.
Would he also want to say that if a proposition is a state
of affairs, it must be showable that it is or that if a men-
tal state of affairs is a physical state of affairs, it must
be showable that it is? It would have been helpful if
Benacerraf had answered such questions.
Perhaps we can gain some insight into the plausibility
of (10) (and thus (6)) by considering the following closely-
related principle. Let 'S' abbreviate 'is a non-set'.
Consider
(20) S(0) *g(0)
(20) just says that if 0 is a non-set, then it can be shown
that it is a non-set. The relation of (20) to (10) is quite
interesting. First of all, although in the absence of a
clear justification of these principles, it is difficult to
be certain about this, it appears as though (10) is plausible
if (20) is. The two principles are, so to speak, on the
same level. It is (rather difficult to imagine a justifi-
cation of either of these principles which would not also be
a justification of the other. But now consider.
-*S (0)( 21 )
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This is just as plausible as (11)
. Benacerraf agrees
([2]: 67). So we have
(22) -S(0)
But then we have an interesting argument
(23) (Ex) (x=0) — (S(0) v -S (0) ) .
Difficulties might arise for (23) if 'is a set' has
in English a limited range of significance so that, perhaps,
'Nixon is a set' has
a
truth value gap. If this is so, then
is a non-set has two possible readings depending on whether
things which fall out of the range of significance of 'is a
set satisfy is a non-set'
. I intend the broader reading
so that whether or not is a set' has a limited range of
significance, (23) is true.
(23) together with (3) and (22) implies (16). In
other words, Benacerraf can argue from (10) and (20) to the
conclusion that 0 does not exist. Even though his own "ex-
tension of the argument that 0 is not a set does not show
that 0 does not exist, here is another extension (which
in a clear way is_ an extension) of that argument which does
seem to show that 0 does not exist. That is, it shows it
if (10) and (20) are reasonable to believe.
Unfortunately, (10) and (20) are too strong to be
plausible. Let 'q.' be the name of, say, the proposition
that Nixon exists. Then we can construct an argument exactly
parallel to that which we have just constructed.
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(24) S(a) —» *S_(a)
(25) 6(a) —=» *S(a)
(26) -*S(a)
(27) -*S(a)
(28) (Ex) (x=a) —> (S (a) v-S(a))
(29) - (Ex) (x=a)
Each of the premises of this argument is just as
plausible as the principles from which they are obtained
by replacing 'O' with 'a'. Furthermore, we could replace
'a' with any other name of a necessary existent (except the
standard name of set) and the resulting premises would be -
equally plausible. And as for standard names of sets, if
we replace 'a' by such a name and 'S' by 'is a number' and
'6' by 'is a non-number', once again the resulting premises
are plausible. (I do not think that 'a' could be replaced
by a name of a contingently existing being if 'S' means 'pure
set' i.e. a set which does not contain any non-sets in its
transitive closure, for any such thing is a non-set because
it, unlike a pure set, does not necessarily exist.) In
other words, using the same sort of argument Benacerraf
uses to show that 0 is not a set, it can be shown that there
are no beings which exist necessarily.
I think this shows that (10) is too strong to be
plausible. Let me summarize. Benacerraf has not explained
why (10) is plausible, but it appears clear that (10) is
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plausible if (20)
,
(24) and an infinite number of other
principles are plausible. If we assume (10) and hence the
other principles patterned after it, we can show that there
are no beings which exist necessarily. But that such a
strong conslusion could be obtained from assuming (10) makes
it seem highly implausible. Of course, Benacerraf would
answer this argument by showing that (10) unlike at least
some of the principles patterned after it is plausible, but
he certainly has not done that. I thus conclude that in
the absence of such a justification of (10)
,
it should be
rejected. To put it succinctly, given that the fact that
we cannot tell whether or not God is a set does not show
that God does not exist, so the fact that we cannot tell
whether or not 0 is a set does not show that 0 does not exist.
To apply this directly to (10)
,
given that the fact that
we cannot show that God is a non- set does not show God is
a set, so the fact that we cannot show 0 is a set does not
show it is not a set.
I believe then that Benacerraf' s argument that there
are no numbers which relies on the epistemological premises
(6) and (10) is a failure. In fact, however, certain things
Benacerraf writes suggest that he not only had this episte-
mological argument in mind, but also another argument. The
crucial passage herie, is
For arithmetical purposes the properties of num-
bers which do not stem from the relations they
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bear to one another in virtue of being arrangedm a progression are of no consequence whatso-ever^ But it would only be these properties thatwould single out a number as this object or that.
Therefore numbers are not objects at all, becauseln
.§^v^ng the ^properties (that is, necessary andsu
- ticient) ot numbers you merely characterize
an abstract structure and the distinction lies inthe fact that the "elements” of the structure have
no properties other than those relating them toother elements of the same structure
. . . That
a system of objects exhibits the structure of theintegers implies that the elements of that svstemhave some properties not dependent on structureio be the number 3 is no more and no less than to’be preceded by 2
,
1 and possibly 0 and to be fol-lowed by 4, 5, and so forth. ([2]: 69-70).
The epistemological connotations of 'single out'
suggest that in the first paragraph he is perhaps appealing
to (19). If so, the argument here is now familiar. But
in the following paragraph (with one exception: he speaks
of the problem of "individuating" objects), there is no hint
that he is appealing to epistemological premises such as
(6), (10) or (19). In short, it appears as though, having
stated his epistemological argument, he then turns to ap-
proach the problem from a new point of view. What then does
he argue here?
The claim is, roughly, that numbers do not have
enough properties to exist. This is, of course, what his
epistemological argument attempted to establish from the
premise that we cannot tell whether any number is a set.
Here, however, the claim might be simply that for no number
x is being a set or being a non-set included among the
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properties of x. What is Benacerraf
' s argument for this?
Besides his epistemological argument, the only passage which
is relevant is the second paragraph of the above quotation.
Let us examine just what Benacerraf has said in the second
paragraph. First, I will take a quite literal interpreta-
tion of this paragraph. Then I will consider a weaker and
perhaps more charitable interpretation of it.
(i) In giving the necessary and sufficient proper -
ties of numbers you merely characterize an abstract struc-
ture. I believe that we could replace 'abstract structure'
here by 'isomorphism type'. Then the claim is that, for
example, 0 has only those properties which are had by every
thing which is the "0" of some structure which has the iso-
morphism type of the numbers.
But consider the property of being distinct from
Frege. It is plausible to think that 0 has that property,
because 0 necessarily exists and Frege does not. Further-
more, Frege is the "0" of a structure which has the iso-
morphism type of the numbers.
Note also that it is plausible to think that 0 alone
has the property of being the predecessor of 1. It is the
only thing which has that property. Of course, things
other than 0 satisfy the formal equivalent of ' is the
predecessor of 1' in some models of arithmetic, but this
does_ not show that these things have the property of being
the predecessor of 1.
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(li) .The numbers only have properties relating them
to o ther numbers. The example noted above is a counter-
example to this claim. Being distinct from Frege is a
property 0 has which is not a property which relates 0 to
other numbers.
But furthermore since all the properties relating
numbers to numbers are had, if at all, necessarily, this
claim would imply that 3 does not have any properties con-
tingently. 3, however, has the property of numbering the
books on my desk contingently.
(lii) To be 3 is no more and no less than to be
preceded by 2, 1, . . . if Benacerraf is simply
. saying that
3 is uniquely picked out by 'the successor of 2
' he is not
saying anything that a platonist would deny. If he is
saying that the only properties 3 has are those of being
the successor of 2, being the successor of the sucdessor
of 1, etc., his claim would seem to be refuted by the fact
that 3 has the property of being prime.
Perhaps instead the claim is that if 3 has a property
P then the proposition that 3 has P is entailed by the con-
junction of the propositions that 3 is the successor of 2,
that 3 is the successor the the successor of 1, etc. The
difficulty here is ^hat this conjunction would be necessarily
true and since no necessarily true proposition entails any
contingently true proposition, it would follow that 3 does
not have any properties contingently. We have already seen
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that this is false.
We have reached this situation: Benacerraf attempts
to argue, roughly, that numbers do not have enough properties
to exist. He attempts to show this by arguing that numbers
have only certain "structural" properties. We have just
argued that this strong claim is false. Thus, as far as he
develops it, this non-epistemological argument is a failure.
But, of course, this strong claim could be false
while it is still true that numbers do not have enough
properties to exist. (Perhaps, in fact, it was some such
weaker claim that Benacerraf meant to endorse. What fol-
lows then may be understood as another interpretation of
the above quotation.) In particular, is 0, say, <t> or not?
If one set theorist constructs arithmetic in such a way that
0 is identified with (zS and another constructs arithmetic in
such a way that 0 is identified with {(6} is at least one
of them accepting a (harmless) falsehood? I have no argu-
ment to show that the answer to this question should be,
No, but I do have an intuition that the answer is, No.
This may be clearer in the case of ordered pairs.
Are ordered pairs sets? The facts are that ordered pairs
can be "identified" with sets. Beyond that there seems
to me to be no further question: ' (a, Id) is (a, [<t>
,
b }
}
'
is neither true nor false.
It should be clear that if there is anything to this
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intuition, it applies generally to mathematics. 'Rationals
are ordered pairs of natural numbers', 'reals are sets of
rationals', 'complex numbers are ordered pairs of reals',
'n-place relations are sets of ordered n-tuples' all are
neither true nor false.
In some cases I hope this will seem to be quite
clear: 'ordered pairs are sets' may be a case of this.
Furthermore, if it is thought that one of these sentences
just listed is neither true nor false, then I think that
it should also be held that they all are neither true nor
false. There does not appear to be any important differ-
ence between these examples.
One final point is this: this intuition applies
not only to pure mathematical entities, but also to impure
ones, e.g. '(^Nixon, Ford^> = {Nixon, {$, Ford}}' is neither
true nor false.
In short, I have a certain intuition. Benacerraf
apparently does, too, and he thought he could support this
intuition by two arguments, both of which I have argued are
unsuccessful. I have no arguments to replace his here
although a principle quite similar to (19) is discussed
in Chapter Six. Simply relying on an intuition is a rather
weak position to be in, but I think that this position can
be strengthened by showing how a theory of mathematical
truth can be constructed which does accord with this
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intuition. It is also interesting to see how a platonistic
theory of mathematics cannot account for this intuition.
According to the platonistic theory I am interested
in discussing, both 'O' and 0 have single referents and
there is a class which is the extension of 'is a set' ('S')
If so, then both
and
(30) 0=0
(31) S(0)
are either true or false. According to my intuition, neither
of these sentences is either true or false.
Is there then a modified platonistic position which
would accord with this intuition? Consider (31) . Intui-
tively, we could pin the truth-valuelessness of (31) on
either 'S' or 'O'
.
Either 'S' does not have a unique ex-
tension or 'O' does not have a unique referent. Similar
remarks apply to (30)
.
Thus far, however, the platonist does not appear to
be forced to pin the difficulty on 'S' or to pin it on 'O'.
Whatever choice is made, however, forces certain other
choices. For example, if we say 'S' has a unique extension,
pinning the difficulty on 'O', then we will have to pin the
truth-valuelessness ofWS(<^0, 0^>) ' on ’ , 0^' , thereby
rejecting a platonistic theory of ordered pairs. Other
choices, will also be forced.
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The intuition I have, however, will not through
considerations like these force saying that 'S' does not
have a unique extension, that 'O' does not have a unique
referent, etc. All that is forced is certain conditional
statements such as, if 'S' has a unique extension, then 'O'
does not have a unique referent.
It is thus quite consistent with my intuition that
a platonistic theory of sets, say, is true. The modified-
platonist who has my intuition could say 'O' does not have
a unique referent, but
'
cS ' does; there are sets although
there are no numbers
.
Although this position is consistent with my intui-
tion, it is ill-motivated. What, besides a desire to pre-
serve some form of platonism would lead anyone to accept
such a modified view? In the absence of some argument to
the contrary, it is reasonable to hold that if either 'O'
or ' <j) ' lack unique referents then both of these terms do.
In short, anyone who accepts my intuition should also re-
ject the thesis that any mathematical term (predicate) has
a unique referent (extension). Such a person should reject
any form of platonism with respect to mathematical entities.
In short, my intuition is incompatible with a cer-
tain natural view of mathematical truth. In the absence
of another theory of mathematical truth, the most reasonable
response to this would be . to say: so much the worse for my
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intuition. As we have seen already, however, there are
theories of mathematical truth which are compatible with
this intuition. If a combined arithmetic and set theory
is interpreted as either an IAIT or a IMAIT
,
then such sen-
tences as (30) and (31) can be allowed to be neither true
nor false.
This fact provides some support for this intuition,
but the light shines in the other direction, too. If inter-
preting mathematics as either an IAIT or a IMAIT allows us
to account for an inLuition not to be accounted for in other
ways, this provides some jusification for saying either that
informal mathematics is best represented as an IAIT or that
informal mathematics is best represented as an IMAIT. These
considerations, however, are neutral between whether mathe-
matics is best represented as an IAIT or an IMAIT.
CHAPTER VI
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It has often been thought that platonism suffers
from epistemological problems: we know certain mathematical
truths, but hew could we know such truths given a platonistic
account of mathematical language? A related question is,
if we cake platonism to be the claim that mathematical con-
s cants refer to mathematical entities, then how is it that
they do refer? This is the question raised by Michael Jubien
in a recent paper [ 14 ]
.
Jubien approaches this problem by asking if there
is a satisfactory platonistic account of mathematical truth.
He conceives of a platonistic account of mathematical truth
as proceeding by first formalizing the syntax of an informal
mathematical theory and then selecting a model (whose domain
consists of pure abstract entities) of that formal theory.
A sentence of the informal theory is said to be true if its
formalized counterpart is true in the selected model.
Jubien aoes not claim that this is the only way a
platonist could give a theory of mathematical truth, blit
he does suggest that the difficulties confronting the above
approach would affect any other "platonistic" approach.
Jubien argues that this platonistic account breaks
down because we cannot select a model (whose domain con-
sists of pure abstract entities) to interpret a formalized
mathematical theory. Suppose, for example, that this theory
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has the constant 'O' in its language. Then, to specify a
model of this theory it is necessary that 1 0
' be assigned
some pure abstract entity as its denotation.
Now the obvious way of doing this is to say: let
'O' denote zero. (For the sake of clarity I use "0" al-
ways as a name of the formal theory constant and "zero"
always as a name of the informal theory constant. I follow
a similar convention with other number words.) Jubien does
not deal with this directly, but he does deal with a similar
obvious approach when he says that if we were to assume from
the outset that there are, say, sets, this would be inap-
propriate because, it is tantamount to the assumption that
there is a satisfactory platonistic account of mathematical
truth" ([14]: 2).
Apparently then the project which Jubien presents
to the platonist is to select a model without using specifi
cally mathematical language in the metalanguage to do this.
Suppose then that the platonist cannot do this.
What would this show? Jubien concludes that a platonistic
account of mathematics cannot be given from the fact that
the platonist cannot complete this project. But why should
it be supposed that evdnif a platonistic account of mathe-
matics is true, that the platonist should be able to give
such an account without using mathematical language?
Jubien does not directly deal with this question,
but at least the outlines of the answer seem to be clear.
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He takes it to be an open question whether or not a plato-
nistic account of mathematics is true. To assume that a
denotation for 'O' could be established simply by saying,
"let 'O' denote zero," is to assume that 'zero' has a
referent. And that is essentially to assume that a plato-
nistic account of mathematics is true. The platonist who
takes this obvious approach would thus be question-begging.
Suppose then that there is no non-question-begging
way of selecting a model. Jubien concludes from this that
a platonistic account of mathematics is false. Why does
the conclusion follow?
Jubien apparently is appealing to the premise that
if 'zero' has a referent, then there is a non-question-
begging way of assigning a denotation to 'O'. To repeat,
a non-question-begging way of doing this is- to do it with-
out using mathematical language.
Why should we accept the premise that if 'zero' has
a referent, then there is a non-question-begging way of
assigning a denotation to 'O'? Once again, I am going some
what beyond what Jubien says
,
but I suggest that the reason
is that if 'zero' has a referent, then someone must have
fixed its reference. ^furthermore
,
any terms or predicates
used in such a reference-fixing must already (temporally)
have denotations.
Now perhaps 'zero' had its reference fixed as
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referring to the first natural number. That would be accept-
able provided first natural number' already (temporally)
had a denotation, but not every mathematical term or predi-
cate could have its denotation fixed by using mathematical
language. The resultant circle would in this case be vicious
since the terms used in fixing a term's reference must al-
ready (temporally) have denotations.
The premise which appears to be justified by this
line of reasoning is that if 'zero' has a referent, then
there is non-question-begging way of assigning a denotation
to some mathematical term or predicate. Jubien can then be
understood as arguing that there is no such way.
It might be objected to the above argument that it
is false that if zero has a referent, then someone must
have fixed its reference, since this seems to imply that
there was some one occasion on which 'zero' (or some word
from which it has been derived) was introduced as a referring
expression. This might seem to be excessively unrealistic.
Granted- Let us not therefore read into the expres-
sion 'the reference of a was fixed' the implication that
there was some one occasion on which a was introduced as
having a specific referent. Still, if 'zero' refers to some-
thing, it is because of some facts about the people who use
this word and it could not be that every mathematical term
or predicate had its reference fixed by using some other
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mathematical term or predicate. In other words, some people
brought it about (perhaps not intentionally and perhaps not
at one specific time) that 'zero' has a referent (if in
fact it does)
. We can do the same thing (in an idealized
fashion) just as they did, that is, without using some other
mathematical term or predicate in fixing the reference of
any such term or predicate. Thus we have our conclusion:
if 'zero' has a referent, then we can assign a denotation
to some mathematical term or predicate without using mathe-
matical language.
This has been said in clarification and support of
Jubien's approach. He then proceeds by asking whether 'O'
is a term which can be assigned some pure abstract entity
as its denotation without using mathematical language. He
says, "at the outset there seem [to be] only two possible
ways [of doing this]: by ostension and by (unique) descrip-
tion" ([14]: 3).
At this point we can give Jubien's argument very
quickly; 'O' cannot be assigned a denotation by ostension
because only sensible things can be ostended and no pure ab-
stract entity is sensible. 'O' cannot be assigned a denota-
tion by unique description, because the only descriptions
which even appear to describe a pure abstract entity uniquely
all use mathematical language.
This argument can easily be generalized as Jubien
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does : no mathematical term or predicate can have its denota-
tion fixed by ostension and the only descriptions which even
appear to describe uniquely the denotation of any such term
or predicate all use mathematical language. Thus, no mathe-
matical term or predicate has a denotation.
This is Jubien's conclusion, but it appears that he
might have drawn a much stronger conclusion. There are
some difficult issues here, but prima facie the same sort
of argument shows that 'property' 'state of affairs’ and
'proposition' all do not have denotations. (A possible
difficulty here is that some people have claimed that we
can actually see properties such as redness, so that such
properties are sensible.)
In particular, however, in a later part of his paper,
Jubien assumes that although we cannot refer to pure sets,
we can refer to any non - empty set, provided that we can
refer to all of its members.
Jubien does not attempt to support this assumption.
Furthermore, I believe that it is unwarranted given his
argument that reference to pure sets and numbers is impos-
sible, since the same sort of argument can be used to show
that 'the empty set' does not have a referent. That is, if
a term which purports^to refer to a set all of whose members
are specifiable in fact has a referent, then some similar
term- can be assigned a denotation without using that sort of
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language. Such terms purport to refer to abstract entities.
Therefore no such term can be assigned a denotation by-
extension. Finally, the only descriptions which appear to
describe the referent of such a term uniquely all use one
or more of those terms. Therefore no such term has a re-
ferent .
Finally, the restriction that any non - empty set is
specifiable, provided its members are appears arbitrary.
Why not say that any set is specifiable provided its members
are? If so, then the empty set would be specifiable as
'the set containing no members'. Thus, Jubien's argument
can be used to undercut his assumption and also the re-
striction on his assumption appears to be arbitrary.
Of course, in Chapter Four it was argued that in
fact his approach does not require the assumption that any
sets can be objects of reference. If that argument was un-
sound, however, we have now seen that if Jubien has under-
cut platonism, he has also provided grounds for rejecting
the assumption he makes in constructing his own theory of
mathematical truth. Does his argument show that reference
to pure abstract entities is impossible?
There are some apparent counterexamples to the claim
that 'O' cannot have( its reference fixed without using
mathematical language. 'The referent of .'zero'' and 'what
I am now thinking about' both might uniquely describe some
1
pure abstract entity and neither use (though the first
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mentions)
-any mathematic al language.
If we think of ourselves as attempting to recreate
(in an idealized fashion) how it was that 'zero' came to
have a referent we cannot use the expression 'the referent
of zero to do this for no such expression could have been
used by anyone to pick out the referent of 'zero' until
'zero' already had a referent. The case of 'what I am now
thinking about' seems to suffer from a similar fault. 'what
I am now thinking about' picks out something only if I have
picked out that thing sufficiently so that I can have de re
beliefs about it. But then, however it was that I picked
that thing out, I could have used the same method directly
to fix the reference of 'O'. Fixing the reference of 'O’
by using what 1 am now thinking about' thus only transfers
our problem to asking how it was that I am able to have de
re beliefs about that thing.
We have spoken of fixing the reference of 'O' in
a non-question-begging way. By that we meant doing it
t
It is appropriate here to say why we do not discussQuine's approach in The Roots of Reference to carry out this
project of re-creation. My reason for this is that as I read
"Ontological Relativity", Quine thinks that there is no such
thing as reference. The project which I take him to be pur-
suing in The Roots of Reference is that of explaining how,
for example
,
number words came to be used as if they re-'
ferred. No reason is given for thinking that they do refer.
In fact, the picture Quine paints of how number words came
to be used as if they referred--essentially
,
a series of
confusions, would, if anything, indicate that number words
do not refer.
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without using mathematical language. The above remarks sug-
gest that we should expand this notion by requiring that we
fix the reference of 'O' by not only not using mathematical
language, but also by not using semantical or intentional
language. Furthermore, for the reasons indicated in the
preceding paragraph, the argument that if 'zero' has a
referent then 'O' can be assigned a denotation in this way
goes through as before.
I believe that it is clear that no mathematical term
or predicate can be assigned a denotation by unique descrip-
tion in a non-question-begging way. If we consider the set
S of mathematical terms and predicates, certain subsets of
S are such that the denotation of every mathematical term
or predicate can be fixed in terms of the members of S, but
we cannot (without cheating by using semantical or inten-
tional language) fix the denotation of any member of S with-
out using some other member of S.
Further doubts about Jubien's argument might come
at two other points. (a) Is it true that we cannot assign
a denotation to any mathematical term by ostension? (b) Is
it true that if we can assign a denotation to say, 'O', then
this must be done either by ostension or by unique descrip-
tion?
(a) Jubien argues that if we can assign a denotation
to 'O' by ostension, then that denoted thing is sensible.
He is here thinking of what Quine calls direct ostension:
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the ostended thing is actually sensed or in some way in-
tuited ([26]: 39-40). Now some platonists, e.g. Plato
([20]: 81b-e, 85d-86b; [21]: 73c-77b, 83b), Russell
([30]: 101), Godel ([9]: 271), have thought that at some
times we actually sense abstract entities. For such plato-
nists, direct ostension would be sufficient to assign a
denotation to mathematical terms or predicates. As Jubien
points out, however, there seems to be no such sense ([14] : 4)
.
In the absence of a much more adequate discussion of this
supposed sense, the view that we have such a sense is
unsatisfactory given the widespread belief that we have no
such sense.
Quine also discusses deferred ostension: this is
the case where we point at something with the purpose of
ostending something else. Could we assign a denotation to
'O' (or some other numberal, 'O' being, perhaps, an unfortu-
nate example) by deferred ostension?
I am aware of no explicit attempt in the literature
to argue that this can be done. (In fact, apart from the
just-mentioned theory of a special sense propounded by Plato,
Russell and Godel little has been said about how a denotation
could be assigned to, say, '0'.) Perhaps the closest to
such an attempt is Qudne ' s discussion of deferred ostension,
but this is undercut by Quine's general doubts as to whether
any term has a referent.
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The question I wish to pursue here is whether if
we, so to speak, subtract Quine's doubts about ostension
from his discussion of deferred ostension, we would have the
outlines of a theory according to which we could, say,
assign a denotation to 'O' by deferred ostension.
What is involved in deferred ostension? Take a
simple case. You point at large footprints in the ground
and say, "Bigfoot" meaning to introduce 'Bigfoot' as a
predicate true of the animals which make those sort of
prints. (To make this as simple as possible, assume there
are such animals.) Under what conditions are you success-
ful in doing this? You need to know some relationship which
holds between the prints and a Bigfoot . In this case the
relation is: a Bigfoot makes these prints. If you did
not know that that was the relation in question, you would
not successfully fix the extension of 'Bigfoot'.
-
Take another case: you want to fix the reference
of 'Leibniz' for a friend. So you point at a picture of
Leibniz and say, "Leibniz". In order for you to succeed,
your friend needs to know what the relation is between what
you point at and Leibniz. In this case, the relation is:
is a picture of.
These examples suggest the following necessary con-
dition for successfully fixing the reference of a constant
by deferred ostension.
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(C) x fixes the reference of 'a' to be a by os-
tending b only if there is some relation R
such that R holds uniquely between a and tT
and x believes that R holds uniquely between
something and b.
The parallel principle for predicates is
:
(P) x fixes the extension of ' P ' to be a set by
ostending b only if there is a relation R~such
that R holds between S and b and x believes
that R holds between something and b.
These do seem to be necessary conditions of fixing
the reference of a term or predicate by deferred ostension.
In order to fix reference by deferred ostension, I need to
know what relation the referent-to-be bears to the directly
ostended thing. In the case of (C) if, furthermore, x were
to intend to let 'a' refer to the unique thing which bears
R to b, that would be sufficient for x to fix the reference
of 'a' to be a. This makes it clear that (C) and (P) are
the hard cases: if (C) or (P) could be satisfied in the
case of numbers, then in fact the denotation of some arith-
metical terms or predicates could be fixed by deferred os-
tension. Thus, henceforth we will treat (C) and (P) as
not only necessary, but also sufficient conditions for fixing
reference by deferred ostension.
Consider now Quine's simple example of deferred os-
tension of linguistic types by direct ostension of tokens
of that type. (For reasons to be noted later, this is a
simpler case than that of deferred ostension of numbers.)
Could I fix the reference of 'the type of 'a'' by ostending
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'a'? According to ( C )
,
if I can do this, then there is a
relation R such that I believe truly that there is something
(which in fact is the type of 'a') which bears R uniquely
to 'a'. In this case it is clear that the relation in ques-
tion is : is the type of .
Suppose (this is the crucial case as we have seen)
further that I do not as yet have in my vocabulary any
synonym of 'is the type of'. I am, so to speak, just trying
to "break into" talk about types. Could I then truly believe
that there is something which is the type of that token?
That appears to be the question, since it is to ask whether
I could fix the reference of 'the type of ’a" by deferred
ostension without using talk about types.
I am arguing that if the reference of 'the type of
'a
' 1 can be fixed by deferred ostension, then prior to using
type- language I would have to believe truly that there is
something which is the type of the token 'a'. Such belief
would have to be language independent in the sense that I
would have that belief at a time when I lacked the linguistic
means of expressing it.
Furthermore in an historically interesting sense,
this belief would be innate. This historical parallel is
worth considering. A modern philosopher would have said
that if I believe that there is a thing that is the type
of 'a'
,
then I have the concept or idea of being a type .
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Furthermore
,
for the same reason that we have said that
the extension or 'number' cannot be fixed by direct osten-
slon or fixed by unique description without using mathemati-
cal language, a modern philosopher (who accepted our rea-
soning) would have said that this concept of being a type
is neither derived directly from experience, nor is de-
finable in terms of concepts which are derived directly from
experience. In short, it is precisely the sort of concept
which Locke and Hume say we do not have and Descartes and
Leibniz say we do have. It is an innate concept or idea.
This historical parallel can even be drawn further.
Leibniz says that although we do not derive the ideas of,
say, mathematics from the senses, the senses provide the
occasion which allows us to bring them to mind
( [33 !
:
41~3, 53-4)
. Deferred ostension would seem to be a
clear case of this: pointing at the token 'a' brings to
mind the idea of the type of that token even though this
idea is not derived from the senses (in the sense of being
derived directly from the senses or defined in terms of
such ideas)
.
To say then that we could believe truly that there
is a thing which is the type of 'a' even though we have no
type- language implies the interesting claims that (i) we can
have the belief that there is something which is the unique
type -of toke.n 'a' at a time when we lack the linguistic
means of expressing that belief and (ii) we have what modern
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philosophers would have called the innate idea of a type.
(ii) appears to be the more likely place to attack
and the empiricists, of course, had such an attack. In
short, Jubien's argument that mathematical terms do not
have referents depends on familiar empiricist assumptions
in the sense that at least in outline the rationalists had
an answer to his argument and that the most likely answer
to the rationalists' argument is an empiricistic theory of
the origin of our ideas.
To categorize his argument in this way is not, of
course, to criticize it. It is, however, to point out that
his argument is not "knock-down" in the sense that there
is no even slightly plausible reply to it. There is such
a reply and it can be adapted from the work of Descartes
and Leibniz. In order to show that numerals do not have
referents, he would have to show that the details of the
rationalists' theory could not be developed in a plausible
fashion.
Thus far only linguistic types have been discussed.
Let us briefly apply the above points to the case of natural
numbers. In order to fix the reference of '2' by deferred
ostension we need doubly-deferred ostension. (This is why
this case is more complicated than the case of linguistic
types.) If we point at two apples and say "two" meaning
to fix the reference of '2', this will be successful only
if two bears the relation of being the number of to
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something which we ostend. But the thing to which two bears
this relation is not anything we can directly ostend; rather
it is a concept or a set. Thus we can think of this process
as involving first direct ostension of the apples, which
brings about deferred ostension of a set or concept, which
finally brings about deferred ostension of two.
(b) Is it true that if we can fix the reference
of 'O' then this must be done either by ostension or unique
description? If by 'ostension' we mean direct ostension ,
then we have already discussed one possible alternative to
this dichotomy. Let us consider another alternative.
The following are, I think, familiar facts about
teaching, say, set theory to someone who has never heard
of set theory. Such teaching often proceeds not by attempting
to ostend sets or by attempting to describe uniquely any
sets, but rather by simply introducing the learner to some
elementary facts of set theory. We say, for example, that
there is a set which has as its only members Nixon and Ford;
that for any two sets there is a set which contains all and
only the members of those sets; that if two sets have all
the same members, they are identical, etc. At some point,
the learner will stop and say, "Oh, now I get it."
This suggests that another way of fixing the reference
of mathematical terms is simply to state some of the appro-
priate theory. Note that stating this theory in no way
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involves uniquely describing any mathematical entity with-
out using mathematical terms. The question to ask then
is
,
is it plausible to suppose that reference could be fixed
in this way?
I am again inclined to think that there is at least
some historical precedent to suppose that it is plausible.
If we take the rationalist point of view that there are in-
nate ideas, then, as we have seen, we can regard the direct
ostension of a token as the trigger which brings to mind the
idea of a type. Similarly, taking the same point of view,
we could regard description of some of the fundamental facts
of set theory as the trigger which brings to mind the idea
of a set. We have already seen that there is some corrobo-
ration to this view in that we can get someone to have the
idea of a set simply by telling that person some set theory.
Having noted this, let us now return to the topic
of deferred ostension. Dropping talk of innate ideas,
which may introduce unnecessary questions of historical
accuracy, let us see exactly what is involved in our reply
to Jubien' s argument. The claim is that we could fix the
reference of 'the type of 'a'' without using any type
language provided we could truly believe that there is a
type of the token 'a' even though we cannot see types, nor
can we uniquely describe them without using type language.
The difficult point here is, could we have such a belief?
We have pointed out, first that Jubien does not argue that
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we could not have such a belief and second that there is
historical precedent for supposing that there are such be-
liefs
.
If we are to be driven in the direction of holding
that there are such beliefs, it would be important to know
more about them. What beliefs are of this kind? What more
can be said about the relationship between these beliefs
and the experiences which are the occasion of our bringing
them to mind? Before they have been brought to mind, in
what sense do we have these beliefs or the concepts which
are used in these beliefs?
I am not sure, however, that we need be pushed further
in the direction of developing this rationalist theory.
Traditionally the argument which has been used in favor of
saying that there are such innate concepts or beliefs has
been an "how else" argument: we have these concepts (be-
liefs), they could not be derived from experience, thus how
else could we have them unless they were innate. (See
.([20]: 81b-81e, 85d-86b
; [33]
:
41-7, 63-4).)
In this case we have a double application of the
”how else" argument. It is argued that since, say, Peano
arithmetic is true, how else could that be unless numerals
have referents. (See ([32]: 57).) And, thus, since numerals
have referents, how else could that be unless we have innate
ideas. In earlier chapters we have seen, however, two
different ways to block the first application of the how
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else argument. That is, we have shown that we can account
for mathematical truth without viewing, say, numerals as
names of pure abstract entities by construing mathematical
theories either as IAIT's or as IMAIT's.
Furthermore, when we undercut this how else argument,
I think we also remove much of the motivation for accepting
the rationalists' theory we have outlined. I think that the
simplicity of empiricist accounts of language and knowledge
are appealing and that one of the major appeals of ration-
alism is simply that it is felt that empiricism cannot
account for the facts. If we can show (as I think we have)
that mathematical truth can be accounted for without positing
innate ideas of types, numbers, sets, etc., then that
severely undercuts the theory that there are such ideas
and, more importantly here, it also strongly supports
viewing mathematics either as an IAIT or as an IMAIT
.
This line of thought would be undercut if we were
forced to recognize innate ideas to, say, account for
language acquisition. That would open the way to sup-
posing that we have innate mathematical concepts. My claim
here is simply that mathematics need not force us in this
direction.
Jubien apparently regards his argument as a knock-
down argument against a platonistic theory which holds that
mathematical constants have referents. I think that enough
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has been said to show that this argument is not as strong
as that. On the other hand, the most likely platonistic
account of how mathematical constants do refer has little
motivation given that there are competing theories of
mathematical truth.
Questions have often been raised as to whether a non-
platonistic theory of mathematical truth is possible. A
more subtle and equally important question has been raised
by Paul Benacerraf : even assuming that a non-platonistic
account of mathematical truth can be given, will this ac-
count carry over in such a way that we can still give this
account when we embed mathematical talk into other kinds of
theories ([1]). We have seen in Chapters Three and Four
that not only can a non-platonistic account of mathematical
truth be given, this account does also carry over to mixed
theories. These facts should undercut much of the doubt
as to the possibility of adequate non-platonistic theories
of mathematical truth.
The topic discussed here connects nicely with the
discussion of Chapter Five. That discussion concerned the
truth value of such sentences as '0=0'. Now if it is true
that neither 'O' nor ' (6 ' have referents, it is very natural
to expect that there might be perplexity as to the truth
value of such sentences. In other words, we can view this
perplexity as some corroboration of the conclusion of Jubien's
argument that neither 'O' nor ' (6 ' have referents.
tions
.
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It would be helpful to summarize these considera-
(1) We have a weak argument against platonism
which, relies on the (unsupported) intuition
tnat 0 =<zS
' is neither true nor false.
(2) We have a more persuasive, but still incon-
clusive, argument against platonism put for-
ward by Jubien (which we have just discussed).
(3) The most likely reply to Jubien' s argument haslittle motivation if there are non-platonistic
theories of mathematical truth.
(4) The fact that there are perplexities over0=0 might be expected if (and explainedby the hypothesis that) neither 'O' nor '0'
have referents
.
(5) We have stated two theories of mathematical
truth which both allow ' 0=0 * to be neither
true ^ nor false and also do not construe 'O'
and ' 0 ' as having referents; furthermore
both of these accounts carry over to mixed
theories
.
( 6
)
Finally (and this is a point we have not
stressed before) both of these theories of
truth are simpler than the platonist's ac-
count in that on these two theories there is
no need to postulate a special kind of entity(the mathematical entity) in order to account
for mathematical truth.
Alone these points are quite weak; together, however,
they form a fairly strong argument against platonism: by
assuming platonism is false we can get the rewards of plato-
nism (an account of mathematical truth) while assuming a
simpler theory of reference, a simpler ontology and also
explaining racts for which platonims does not have satisfying
explanations
.
(5)
,
however, indicates that we have an embarrassment
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of riches m that we have two theories which are opposed to
the platonistic theory which construes mathematical con-
stants as having referents. Is there anything to choose
between interpreting, say, arithmetic as an IAIT and inter-
preting it as an IMAIT?
The only significant difference between these two
accounts which we have seen concerns ontological commitments.
For example, arithmetic construed as an IAIT is committed
to there being infinitely many things. Furthermore, em-
bedding arithmetic (so interpreted) into a theory which does
not have a commitment
_ to there being abstract things may
yield a theory which is committed to there being abstract
things
,
Now arithmetic is supposed to be not only true, but
necessarily true. What reason is there to think that there
are (respectively, must be) infinitely many things? So long
as we maintain the view that numerals have referents, there
is a straightforward answer to this: ' (Ex) (x=0) ' is true
(necessarily true); furthermore it says that zero exists,
so zero and all the other numbers do (must) exist.
In other words so long as we hold a platonistic
view of mathematical language there is reason to believe
that there are (must be) infinitely many things--the in-
finitely many mathematical entities. It is part of con-
struing arithmetic as an IAIT, however, that there are no
special mathematical entities. That is, anything can be
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in the domain of an acceptable structure for arithmetic.
Thus, unless we can find some independent reason to think
that there are (must be) infinitely many things, construing
arithmetic as an IAIT will have the undesirable consequence
that there will be no reason to think that arithmetic is
true (necessarily true). Of course, when we turn to set
theory, as was seen in Chapter 3, the ontological bill may
go up even farther. This seems to be a significant problem
for interpreting mathematical theories as IAIT's. In the
absence of a reason for thinking that there are (must be)
infinitely many things, I suggest that we construe mathe-
matical theories as IMAIT's.
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